Digital Rhetoric
James P. Zappen
Rhetorical Theory 1a: Chaïm Perelman/Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca
I. The Tradition: Aristotle's Analytics, Ethics, and Rhetoric
A. The Analytics
1. "Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions of
the soul; written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so
also is speech not the same for all races of men [i.e., humans]. But the
mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs,
are the same for the whole of mankind [i.e., humankind], as are also the
objects of which those affections are representations, or likenesses,
images, copies." (115)
Aristotle, On Interpretation, in The Categories, On
Interpretation, trans. Harold P. Cooke; Prior Analytics,
trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), I.
16a4-9; 115.
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2.
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Syllogism demonstrating the fact:
The planets (C) do not twinkle (B).
That which does not twinkle (B) is near (A).
Therefore the planets (C) are near (A).
Syllogism demonstrating the reasoned fact (i.e., causation):
The planets (C) are near (B).
That which is near (B) does not twinkle (A).
Therefore the planets (C) do not twinkle (A).
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Adapted from Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, in
Posterior Analytics, trans. Hugh Tredennick; Topica,
trans. E. S. Forster, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 391 (London: William
Heinemann, 1960), I. 13. 78a22-b12; 84-87.
3. "Thus sense-perception gives rise to memory, as we hold; and repeated
memories of the same thing give rise to experience; because the memories,
though numerically many, constitute a single experience. And experience,
that is the universal when established as a whole in the soul—the
One that corresponds to the Many, the unity that is identically present
in them all—provides the starting-point of art and science: art
in the world of process and science in the world of facts." (257-58)
4. "Clearly then it must be by induction that we acquire knowledge of
the primary premisses, because this is also the way in which general
concepts are conveyed to us by sense-perception." (261)
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, in Posterior Analytics,
trans. Hugh Tredennick; Topica, trans. E. S. Forster, Loeb
Classical Library, vol. 391 (London: William Heinemann, 1960),
II. 19. 100a3-10, 100b3-4; 257-58, 261.
B. The Ethics
1. "Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the
choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the
observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by
principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine
it . . . . We must not however rest content with
stating this general definition, but must show that it applies to the
particular virtues . . . . The observance of the
mean in fear and confidence is Courage . . . . In
respect of pleasures and pains . . . the observance
of the mean is Temperance [i.e.,
Self-Control] . . . . In regard to giving and
getting money, the observance of the mean is
Liberality . . . . There are also other
dispositions in relation to money, namely, the mode of observing the
mean called Magnificence . . . , the excess called
Tastelessness or Vulgarity." (95-101)
2. "Therefore the truly great-souled man must be a good man. Indeed
greatness in each of the virtues would seem to go with greatness of
soul. For instance, one cannot imagine the great-souled man running at
full speed when retreating in battle, nor acting
dishonestly . . . ." (217)
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, rev. ed.,
Loeb Classical Library, vol. 73 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1934), II. vi. 15-20, vii. 1-6; IV. iii. 10-11; 95-101, 217.
3. "Among all the relics of Greek antiquity, Aristotle's Ethics
is one of those that retain their interest most freshly. To many
readers, new to this kind of study, its application of rigorous logical
analysis to the problem of conduct comes as a revelation. It is true
that a moral system which so exalts the life of the intellect is in
many ways alien to modern thought and
practice . . . . His [Aristotle's] review of the
virtues and graces of character that the Greeks admired stands in such
striking contrast with Christian Ethics that this section of the work
is a document of primary importance for the student of the Pagan
world. But it has more than a historic value. Both in its likeness and
in its difference it is a touchstone for that modern idea of a
gentleman, which supplies or used to supply an important part of the
English race with its working religion." (xxvii-xxviii)
H. Rackham, "Introduction," in Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics,
by Aristotle, trans. H. Rackham, rev. ed., Loeb Classical Library,
vol. 73 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), xxvii-xxviii.
C. The Rhetoric
1. "That rhetoric, therefore, does not belong to a single defined genus
of subject but is like dialectic and that it is useful is
clear—and that its function is not to persuade but to see the
available means of persuasion in each case." (35)
2. "Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case,
to see the available means of persuasion." (36)
3. "Of the pisteis [proofs] provided through speech there are
three species: for some are in the character [ethos] of the
speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some way, and some in
the argument [logos] itself, by showing or seeming to show
something." (37)
4. "Since pisteis [proofs] come about through these [three
means], it is clear that to grasp an understanding of them is the
function of one who can form syllogisms and be observant about
characters and virtues and, third, about emotions (what each of the
emotions is and what are its qualities and from what it comes to be and
how)." (39)
5. "I am saying that dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are those in
which we state topoi, and these are applicable in common
[koinēi] to questions of justice and physics and politics
and many different species [of knowledge]; for example, the
topos of the more and the less; for to form syllogisms or speak
enthymemes from this about justice will be just as possible as about
physics or anything else, although these subjects differ in species.
But there are 'specifics' that come from the premises of each species
and genus [of knowledge]; for example, in physics there are premises
from which there is neither an enthymeme nor a syllogism applicable to
ethics; and in ethics [there are] others not useful in physics. It is
the same in all cases. The former [the common topoi] will not
make one understand any genus; for they are not concerned with any
underlying subject. As to the latter [the specifics], to the degree
that someone makes better choice of the premises, he [or she] will have
created knowledge different from dialectic and rhetoric without its
being recognized; for if he [or she] succeeds in hitting on first
principles [arkhai], the knowledge will no longer be dialectic
or rhetoric but the science of which [the speaker] grasps the first
principles." (46)
6. "Thus, there would necessarily be three genera of rhetorics,
symbouleutikon ["deliberative"], dikanikon ["judicial"],
epideiktikon ["demonstrative"]. (48)
7. "In so far as someone tries to make dialectic or rhetoric not just
mental faculties but sciences, he [or she] unwittingly obscures their
nature by the change, reconstructing them as forms of knowledge of
certain underlying facts, rather than only of speech." (53)
8. "After this [that is, after a discussion of the deliberative and
judicial genres], let us speak of virtue and vice and honorable and
shameful, for these are the points of reference for one praising or
blaming. Moreover, as we speak of these, we shall incidentally also
make clear those things from which we [as speakers] shall be regarded
as persons of a certain quality in character, which was the second form
of pistis [proof]; for from the same sources we shall be able to
make both ourselves and any other person worthy of credence in regard
to virtue." (79)
9. "The parts [or subdivisions] of virtue are justice, manly courage,
self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness,
prudence, and wisdom." (79-80)
10. "Consider also the audience before whom the praise [is spoken];
for, as Socrates used to say, it is not difficult to praise Athenians
in Athens." (83)
Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans.
George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), I. 1. 14;
I. 2. 1, 2, 7, 21; I. 3. 3; I. 4. 6; I. 9. 1, 5, 28; 35-37, 39, 46, 48,
53, 79-80, 83.
11. "The most concrete meaning given for the term [ethos] in the
Greek lexicon is 'a habitual gathering place,' and I suspect that it is
upon this image of people gathering together in a public place, sharing
experiences and ideas, that its meaning as character rests. To have
ethos is to manifest the virtues most valued by the culture to
and for which one speaks—in Athens: justice, courage, temperance,
magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom."
(60)
S. Michael Halloran, "Aristotle's Concept of Ethos, or If Not His
Somebody Else's," Rhetoric Review 1 (1982), 60.
II. Chaïm Perelman/Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca on the New Rhetoric
A. Speaker and Audience
1. "The authors of scientific reports and similar papers often think
that if they merely report certain experiments, mention certain facts,
or enunciate a certain number of truths, this is enough of itself to
automatically arouse the interest of their hearers or readers. This
attitude rests on the illusion, widespread in certain rationalistic and
scientific circles, that facts speak for themselves and make such an
indelible imprint on any human mind that the latter is forced to give
its adherence regardless of its inclination." (17)
2. "The contact between the speaker and his [or her] audience is not
confined to the conditions preliminary to argumentation: it is equally
necessary if argumentation is to develop. For since argumentation aims
at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is,
in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced." (18-19)
B. Audience as a Construction of the Speaker
1. "The audience, as visualized by one undertaking to argue, is always
a more or less systematized construction . . . . The
essential consideration for the speaker who has set himself [or herself]
the task of persuading concrete individuals is that his [or her]
construction of the audience should be adequate to the occasion" (19)
2. "Every social circle or milieu is distinguishable in terms of its
dominant opinions and unquestioned beliefs, of the premises that it
takes for granted without hesitation: these views form an integral part
of its culture, and an orator wishing to persuade a particular audience
must of necessity adapt himself [or herself] to it." (20-21)
3. "The writers of antiquity recognized three types of oratory, the
deliberative, the forensic, and the epidictic [epideictic], which
in their view corresponded respectively to an audience engaged in
deliberating, an audience engaged in judging, and an audience that is
merely enjoying the unfolding of the speaker's argument without having to
reach a conclusion on the matter in question . . . .
Particularly unsatisfactory is its characterization of the epidictic
type of oratory . . . ." (21)
C. Adaptation of the Speaker to the Audience
1. "In argumentation, the important thing is not knowing what the
speaker regards as true or important, but knowing the views of those he
[or she] is addressing. To borrow Gracian's simile, speech is 'like a
feast, at which the dishes are made to please the guests, and not the
cooks.'" (23-24)
D. Persuading and Convincing
1. "We are going to apply the term persuasive to argumentation
that only claims validity for a particular audience, and the term
convincing to argumentation that presumes to gain the adherence
of every rational being." (28)
E. The Universal Audience
1. "Thus the nature of the audience to which arguments can be successfully
presented will determine to a great extent both the direction the
arguments will take and the character, the significance that will be
attributed to them. What formulation can we make of audiences, which have
come to play a normative role, enabling us to judge on the convincing
character of an argument? Three kinds of audiences are apparently
regarded as enjoying special prerogatives as regards this function,
both in current practice and in the view of philosophers. The first such
audience consists of the whole of mankind [i.e., humankind], or at least,
or all normal, adult persons; we shall refer to it as the universal
audience. The second consists of a single interlocutor whom a
speaker addresses in a dialogue. The third is the subject himself
[or herself] when he [or she] deliberates or gives himself [or
herself] reasons for his [or her] actions . . . . Each
speaker's universal audience can, indeed, from an external viewpoint, be
regarded as a particular audience, but it nonetheless remains true that,
for each speaker at each moment, there exists an audience transcending all
others, which cannot easily be forced within the bounds of a particular
audience . . . . Hence the primordial importance of
the universal audience, as providing a norm for objective argumentation,
since the other party to a dialogue and the person deliberating with
himself [or herself] can never amount to more than floating incarnations
of this universal audience." (30-31)
2. "It is always hazardous for a writer or speaker to identify with
logic the argumentation intended for the universal audience, as he
[or she] himself [or herself] has conceived it. The concepts that men
[and women] have formed, in the course of history, of 'objective facts'
and 'obvious truths' have sufficiently varied for us to be wary in this
matter. Instead of believing in a universal audience, analogous to the
divine mind which can assent only to the 'truth,' we might, with greater
justification, characterize each speaker by the image he himself [or she
herself] holds of the universal audience that he [or she] is trying to
win over to his [or her] view." (33)
3. "Each individual, each culture, has its own conception of the
universal audience. The study of these variations would be very
instructive, as we would learn from it what men [and women], at
different times in history, have regarded as real, true,
and objectively valid." (33)
F. Arguing before a Single Hearer (Argumentation, Dialogue, Debate)
1. "Dialogue, as we consider it, is not supposed to be a debate,
in which the partisans of opposed settled convictions defend their
respective views, but rather a discussion, in which the
interlocutors search honestly and without bias for the best solution
to a controversial problem . . . . The assumption
is that in discussion the interlocutors are concerned only with putting
forward and testing all the arguments, for and against, bearing on the
various matters in question . . . . In a debate, on
the other hand, each interlocutor advances only arguments favorable to
his [or her] own thesis, and his [or her] sole concern with arguments
unfavorable to him [or her] is for the purpose of refuting them or
limiting their impact." (37-38)
2. "The heuristic dialogue [i.e., discussion], in which the interlocutor
is an incarnation of the universal audience, and the eristic dialogue
[i.e., debate], which aims at overpowering the opponent, are both merely
exceptional cases. In ordinary dialogue the participants are simply
trying to persuade their audience so as to bring about some immediate
or future action; most of our arguments in daily life develop at this
practical level." (39)
G. Self-Deliberating
1. "The deliberating subject is often regarded as an incarnation of the
universal audience . . . . Agreement with oneself is
merely a particular case of agreement with others. Accordingly, from our
point of view, it is by analyzing argumentation addressed to others that
we can best understand self-deliberation, and not vice versa." (40-41)
H. Premises of Argumentation
1. "We shall begin by considering the question of what sort of agreements
can serve as premises [for argumentation] . . . . We
think it convenient to divide these objects of agreement into two
classes: the first concerning the real, comprising facts,
truths, and presumptions, the other concerning the preferable,
comprising values, hierarchies, and lines of argument relating to the
preferable." (66)
2. Facts. "The way in which the universal audience is thought of, and
the incarnations of this audience that are recognized, are thus
determining factors in deciding what, in a particular case, will be
considered to be a fact, characterized by adherence of the universal
audience, an adherence such as to require no further
strengthening . . . . From the standpoint of
argumentation, we are confronted with a fact only if we can postulate
uncontroverted, universal agreement with respect to it. But it follows
that no statement can be assured of definitively enjoying this status,
because the agreement can always be called in question
later . . . ." (67)
3. Truths. "Everything just said about facts is equally
applicable to what are called truths. The term 'facts' is
generally used to designate objects of precise, limited agreement,
whereas the term 'truths' is preferably applied to more complex systems
relating to connections between facts. These may be scientific theories
or philosophic or religious conceptions that transcend experience."
(68-69)
4. Presumptions. "In addition to admitting facts and truths, all
audiences admit presumptions . . . . In each
particular instance, presumptions are connected with what is normal and
likely." (70-71)
5. Presumptions and the Normal. "Thus, if we suppose a binomial
distribution, the normal usually refers to the mode, together with a
certain margin in both directions . . . . It is the
mode rather than the mean which is dominant in all
presumptions based on what is usual . . . .
Although a presumption based on the normal can rarely be reduced to an
evaluation of frequencies or to the use of definite characteristics of
statistical distribution, it is nevertheless useful to clarify the
usual concept of 'normal' by showing that it always depends on a
reference group . . . which is often a social
group." (71-72)
6. Values. "Agreement with regard to a value means an admission that an
object, a being, or an ideal must have a specific influence on action
and on disposition toward action and that one can make use of this
influence in an argument . . . . Values enter, at
some stage or other, into every argument." (74-75)
7. Abstract and Concrete Values. "In argumentation concerning values,
there is a fundamental, but too often neglected, distinction to be made
between abstract values, such as justice or truth, and concrete values,
such as France or the Church . . . . Though Western
morality, insofar as it is based on Greco-Roman ideas, values most the
obedience to rules that are valid for all people and under all
circumstances, there exist virtues and forms of behavior that can be
conceived only in relation to concrete values. Such notions as
obligation, fidelity, loyalty, solidarity, and discipline are of this
kind. Likewise Confucius' five universally binding
obligations—between rulers and ruled, father and son, husband and
wife, older brother and younger brother, friend and
friend—reflect the importance attached to personal relations
among beings who constitute concrete values for one another." (77)
8. Hierarchies. "Argumentation relies not only on values, both abstract
and concrete, but also on hierarchies, such as the superiority of men
[and women] over animals, of gods over men [and women]." (80)
9. Loci or Topoi. "As used by classical writers, loci [places;
also topoi or topics] are headings under which arguments can be
classified . . . . Aristotle made a distinction
between the loci communes, or 'common places,' which can be used
indiscriminately for any science and do not depend on any, and the
special topics, which belong either to a particular science or a
particular type of oratory." (83)
10. Loci of Quantity. "By loci relating to quantity we mean
those loci communes which affirm that one thing is better than
another for quantitative reasons." (85)
11. Loci of Quality. "Loci of quality occur in argumentation
when the strength of numbers is challenged, and it is in such a context
that they are most readily perceived . . . . At the
limit, the locus of quality leads to the high rating of the
unique which, just like the normal, forms one of the axes of
argumentation." (89)
Ch[aïm] Perelman and L[ucie] Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric:
A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver
(1958; Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 17-21,
23-24, 28, 30-31, 33, 37-41, 66-72, 74-75, 77, 80, 83, 85, 89.
I. Commentary: The Universal Audience, Epideictic Rhetoric
1. "While many have acknowledged, if only in passing, Perelman's claims
about the plurality of universal audiences, most have not trained their
sights on how competing conceptions of truth, identity, and reality
contained in differently situated visions of the universal audience can
potentially clash and vie for control across different planes of social
space." (51)
2. "[From the perspective of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,] struggles between differing
conceptions of the universal audience can be rethought of as battles
for hegemony in which a 'political type of relation' is at
stake, even if discussants seeking a reasonable consensus are unaware
of (or unwilling to acknowledge) the status of this relationship as
political." (52)
3. "One might finally say that the idea of discourse addressed to the
universal audience, like [Roland] Barthes' notion of mythic,
depoliticized speech, simply offered Perelman a novel way to theorize
how contingent and politically-tinged dominant discourses can come to
be seen as descriptions of an enduring and natural reality. While for
Barthes this meant exposing the myths of bourgeois ideology, for
Perelman it meant exposing the myths of rationalist philosophy." (55)
4. "Perhaps once it is juxtaposed alongside the [i.e., Louis
Althusser's] notion of interpellation, the universal audience concept
can be seen to imply that the rhetorical agency of subjects in any
discourse—philosophical, legal, and so on—is both enabled
and constrained by the dominant conceptions of the universal audience
in a given society." (57)
5. "For [Pierre] Bourdieu, the critique of doxa, the bringing of
the 'undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation,'
is thus a kind of 'heresy,' [which] involves, for the dominated classes
at least, 'pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the
arbitrariness of the taken for granted' . . . .
[Similarly,] Perelman directly points to the potential value of the
study of historical and cultural variations in universal audiences:
'The study of these variations would be very instructive, as we would
learn from it what men [and women], at different times in history, have
regarded as real, true, and objectively valid.'"
(58)
6. "Rather than privileging the political relevance of deliberative or
forensic discourse Perelman instead proclaimed that 'without the
spiritual unity which the epideictic discourse properly reinforces,'
political life would be nothing more than 'a sordid struggle of
opposing self-interests' ('Rhetoric and Politics,' 132, 133). In place
of such a struggle, Perelman advised that
we must first want the political order which transcends the particulars
and the conflicts of interests, we must want the communion in the
church, whatever divergences there may be in the interpretation of
sacred texts, in order that submission to the laws, obedience to the
authorities, and respect for the established order should prevail
(133)." (59)
7. "It could be said finally that universal agreement was, for
Perelman, at once something to be strived for and something which was
impossible to arrive at; a philosophical and timeless appearance
of unicity that would always be humbled by a rhetorical and historical
reality of difference." (61)
Antonio Raul de Velasco, "Rethinking Perelman [and Olbrechts-Tyteca]'s
Universal Audience: Political Dimensions of a Controversial Concept,"
Rhetoric Society Quarterly 35: 2 (2005): 51-52, 55, 57-59, 61.
8. "The authors [Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca] focus on the public
character of epideictic and on the standards or principles endorsed in
epideictic argumentation, identifying the purpose of epideictic as the
strengthening of the audience's adherence to communal values." (48)
9. "The communion around the values fostered in epideictic thus comes
to serve as both means and end of argumentation. While strengthening
the audience's adherence to shared values is the 'end' in epideictic,
these shared values in turn serve as starting points, or 'means,
for deliberative and forensic discourse." (50)
Richard Graff and Wendy Winn, "Presencing 'Communion' in Chaïm
Perelman's New Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric 39: 1 (2006):
48, 50.
III. Louis Althusser on Ideology and Interpellation
1. "I say: the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology,
but at the same time and immediately I add that the category of the
subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology
has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete
individuals as subjects. In the interaction of this double
constitution exists the functioning of all ideology, ideology being
nothing but its functioning in its material forms of existence of that
functioning." (116)
2. "I only wish to point out that you and I are always already
subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals of ideological
recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete,
individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable
subjects . . . .
But to recognize that we are subjects and
that we function in the practical rituals of the most elementary
everyday life (the hand-shake, the fact of calling you by your name,
the fact of knowing, even if I do not know what it is, that you 'have'
a name of your own, which means that you are recognized as a unique
subject, etc.)—this recognition only gives us the 'consciousness'
of our incessant (eternal) practice of ideological
recognition—its consciousness, i.e., its
recognition—but in no sense does it give us the
(scientific) knowledge of the mechanism of this recognition."
(117)
3. "I shall say: all ideology hails or interpellates concrete
individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the
category of the subject . . . .
I shall then suggest that ideology 'acts'
or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among the
individuals (it recruits them all), or 'transforms' the individuals
into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation
which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be
imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or
other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!'" (117-18)
Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in
Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster,
85-126 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 116-18.
Latest Update: 2011-09-04
