@~Q {a{a @@@ @@@@Twv[v{a{a EN DB {aB     & . 6p 7  ` I K  X 5  'A1MUTX9d5`9[P1Oih`mmcH Adelson20021 Ariely2001 Barch2001O Bargh1999G Beach1978  Botvinick2001 Braver20010 Busemeyer2001N Busemeyer2002  Carlson2002 Carter20010 Carver1990! Chaffin2002O Chartrand19995 Chater20010" Chater20036 Chater20030 Cohen2001 Cooper2000& Davis1993(Di Lollo2000@L Dolan2002Q Edwards1962 Ekman1992( Enns20002C Erev20030B Erev20040@ Fan2004AFlanagan20010I Geisler2002A Ghahramani2001C Gopher20033P Gratch2004K Gray2004J Hayhoe2000, Henderson2003- Herrnstein1990, Hollingworth20033Houttuin19966Hudlicka2003  Izard1992@ Johnson20040Kahneman2003I Kersten20022 Kerstholt19953 Kerstholt1996< Landy2003  Lang1995& Machado1993< Maloney2003PMarsella2004D Mazur1996F Mellers1999GMitchell1978" Nakisa200305Oaksford2001"Oaksford20036Oaksford2003 Ortony1990o Ortony1992;& Palmer19933 Panksepp1992B Parush200443 Passenier1996" Redington2003( Rensink20007 Rensink2000; Rensink2002F Ritov1999: Rosenbaum2002 Scheier19903Schuffel19966FSchwartz1999@Shallice2000= Shanks2002;Shiffrar2002: Shin2002 Simon1967H Simoncelli2002& Staddon1993. Stanovich1999/ Stanovich2003N Stout2002;Thornton2002NTownsend20022<Trommershauser2003= Tunney2002 Turner1990o  Turner1992;> Vaughan1985@ Wang2004H Weiss2002. West1999/ West2003A Wolpert2001C Yechiam2003B Yechiam2004C Yehene200331 Zakay200101331 Zakay2001331 Zakay2001ne200331 Zakay2001200331 Zakay200100331 Zakay2001331 Zakay20011 Zakay2001331 Zakay20011 Zakay2001331 Zakay20011 Zakay20011 Zakay2001331 Zakay2001331 Zakay2001331 Zakay2001331 Zakay2001331 Zakay20011 Zakay2001ne200331 Zakay20012001Zakay2001331 Zakay2001ʘʌV8nV п V^(8opʰVe,`8l8nʨʈʐT@W<T@8`V^#P0?C8nMICS_LibW?@\@.ȠV$ȿȠT89⠿`V9V999đVWĿPz@VY9e,39⠿ʀʘʌV9W08Wl^(P _pĐ6hP9⠐6V`6~ɀgɀ9⠑VʨgСV^V ʀʘʌV9⠑V п V^(;ʰVe,s99⠿ʨʈʐg@W<g@8`V^#P0?C9MozerKino &CSSConf.pdfȠV$ȿȠT8:P`V:PV::P:tVWĿPz@VY:te,a:PʀʘʌV:PW09I Wl^(P _pĐ6hP:P6V`6~ɀzɀ:PVʨzСV^V ʀʘʌV:PV п V^(:PʰVe,::Pʨʈʐz@W<z@9HБV^#P0?C:P natsample.pdf@c @.ȠV$ȿȠT9 9`V9V999VWĿPz@VY9e,S9ʀʘʌV9W09I Wl^(P _pĐ6hP96V`6~ɀɀ9VʨСV^V ʀʘʌV9V п V^(9ʰVe,99ʨʈʐ@W< @9HБV^#P0?C9PsychSci97-RR.pdf@.ȠV$ȿȠT59 `V9 V99 9DVWĿPz@VY9De,mM9 ʀʘʌV9 W09@Wl^(P _pĐ6hP9 6V`6~ɀɀ9 VʨСV^V ʀʘʌV9 V п V^(9ʰVe,99 ʨʈʐ@W<@9V^#P0?C9  RE-PsychRev-95.pdfȠV$ȿȠT8!99п`V99V989999VWĿPz@VY99e,w99пʀʘʌV99W09@Wl^(P _pĐ6hP99А6V`6~ɀɀ99БVʨСV^V ʀʘʌV99БV п V^(a@ʰVe,9899пʨʈʐ@W<@9V^#P0?C99  RichSimon89_PR.pdfȠV$ȿȠT9`V9V9 99 VWĿPz@VY9 e,wP9ʀʘʌV9W07FWl^(P _pĐ6hP96V`6~ɀɀ9VʨСV^V ʀʘʌV9V п V^(9@ʰVe,9 9ʨʈʐ@W<@7FV^#P0?C93rvb-aisb04.pdf@.ȠV$ȿȠT48p`V8pV8l8p8VWĿPz@VY8e,W߀8pʀʘʌV8pW04Wl^(P _pĐ6hP8p6V`6~ɀɀ8pVʨСV^V ʀʘʌV8pV п V^(aI@ʰVe,8l8pʨʈʐ@W<@aO0V^#P0?C8p1Ftrommeretal03a.pdfȠV$ȿȠT49À`V9ÀV99À9äVWĿPz@VY9äe,u(9ÀʀʘʌV9ÀW04Wl^(P _pĐ6hP9À6V`6~ɀɀ9ÀVʨСV^V ʀʘʌV9ÀV п V^(9`ʰVe,99Àʨʈʐ@W<@aO0V^#P0?C9ÀDYDDMg_rdg_list.doc@.ȠV$ȿȠT9N`V9NV9L9N9NđVWĿPz@VY9Ni`n&9NʀʘʌV9NW0>PWl^(P _pĐ6hP9N6V`6~ɀɀ9NVʨСV^V ʀʘʌV9NV п V^(9MpʰVi`9L9Nʨʈʐ@W<@aV^#P0?C9Nx_  #! ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~}}}@@@@@@@@@@ @@ @@ @@=88;4:?9 X6K-3'0g,z( 7e$$e  7( z, g0 '3- K6 AuthorsJournals !Keywords T                               zv4 Adelson, E. H. Ahn, J. C.(+4Anderson, John R. Ariely, D.(+4 Barch, D. M.4 Bargh, J. A.4 Beach, L. R.4 Booth, L.Botvinick, M. M. Braver, T. S.Braver, Todd S.Busemeyer, Jerome R.Carlson, R. A. Carter, C. S.Carver, Charles S. Chaffin, D. B. Channon, S.+4Chartrand, T. L. Chater, N.(+4 Chu, P. C.(+4 Cohen, J. D.4Cooper, Richard Corbetta, M.4Craik, F. I. M. Daum, I.Davis, D. G. S. Di Lollo, V.4 Dolan, R. J.4 Eber, J. Edwards, W.*Eenshuistra, R. M. Ekman, P.Emerson, M. J. Enns, J. T.+4 Erev, I.d Erev, Ido Fan, JinFlanagan, J. R.Geisler, W. S.Ghahramani, Z.Gigerenzer, G. Gopher, D.(+4 Goschke, T.+4Gratch, Jonathan Gray, J. R.+4Gray, Jeremy R. Gruber, O.(+4 Hayhoe, M.(+4Henderson, J. M.Herrnstein, R. J. Heyder, K.(+4Hollingworth, A. Hommel, B.(+4Houttuin, Kees Hubner, M.(+4 Hudlicka, E.4 Izard, C. E.4Johnson, Todd R. Kahneman, D.4 Kathmann, N.4 Kersten, D.+4Kerstholt, Jose H.  Kluwe, R. H.4 Kray, J. Landy, M. Lang, P. J.+4Lindenberger, U.Luna-Rodriguez, A.  Machado, A.+4Maloney, L. T.Marsella, Stacy Mazur, J. E.4 Mellers, B.+4Mellers, B. A.Mitchell, T. R. Miyake, A.(+4Moore, Simon C. Nakisa, R.(+4 Noe, A.O'Regan, J. K. Oaksford, M.4Oaksford, Mike Ortony, A.(+4 Padilla, F.+4 Palmer, R. G. Panksepp, J.4 Parush, Avi+4Passenier, Peter O. Peters, A.(+4 Redington, M. Regier, T.(+4Rensink, R. A. Reuter, B.(+4Richman, H. B. Riley, M. A.4 Ritov, I.Rosenbaum, D. A.Scheier, Michael F.Schuffel, Herke Schwartz, A.4 Shallice, Tim Shanks, D. R. Shiffrar, M.4 Shin, J. C.+4Shulman, G. L. Simon, H. A.4Simon, Herbert A.Simoncelli, E. P. Sloman, S. A. Spires, E. E.Staddon, J. E. R.Stanovich, K. E.Stout, Julie C. Suchan, B.(+4Thornton, I. M.Townsend, James T. Trommershauser, J.  Tunney, R. J. Turner, T. J. Turvey, M. T. Vaughan, W.+4 Wang, HongbinWeidema, M. A. Weiss, Y. West, R. F.+4Wolpert, D. M. Yechiam, E.+4Yechiam, Eldad Yehene, V.(+4 Zakay, D. Zelazo, P. D.  ! Academy of Management ReviewBActa Psychologica$American Journal of Psychology(V`American Psychologist Animal Learning & Behavior"B Behavioral and Brain SciencesCognitive NeuropsychologyCognitive Psychology Cognitive Systems Research$B0+Current Directions in Psychological ScienceDecision Sciences Human Factors0-Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing4/International Journal of Human-Computer StudiesEN(%Journal of Behavioral Decision Making(%Journal of Cognitive Systems Research0*Journal of Experimental Psychology-General 0+Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied40Journal of the Experimental Analysis of BehaviorNMemory & CognitionNature Neuroscience Nature Reviews Neuroscience$B84Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes Perception Perception & Psychophysics$"Psychological BulletinPsychological ReviewPsychological Science Psychonomic Bulletin & Review SciencepSpatial Vision(4 Trends in Cognitive SciencesBVisual Cognition   ` 3 prisonersci3-dimensional shapezad`a priori probability of false alarms & time pressure, decision making behavior, college studentsPabstract ideasyseacquired sociopathysl acquisitionheaction controltiod`action, change blindness, consciousness, experience, perception, qualia, sensation, sensorimotorPhbaffective HCI, affective computing, affect recognition, affect expression, affective user modeling$Dage-differencesioage-related dissociation ageingiveagingaidsv alternativese analysisoanalytic processesnceanatomical analysis pangeranterior cingulate cortexantisaccade tasklapparent motion arm movementsarticulatory suppression Asperger's syasperger-syndrome Athletesa attention attitudesautomatic integration basal gangliabase-rate fallacy behaviorr beliefionbinocular-rivalrybipolar disordersblinkbrainbrain physiologycatelcategory accessibility((causal inferencee cerebellum cochange-blindnessy childhood childrenc choicechoice strategies cognitioncognitive architecture((cognitive deficitsncecognitive developmentcognitive effortscognitive-developmentcombining experiences competitionincomplexity & a priori probability of disturbances, monitoring & decision making abilities in a ship control task, 18-22 yr olds, Netherlands comprehensioncomputational theorymconditional inference confirmationsconjunction fallacy connectionism connectionist consequencesu consolidation consumptionnp contemptocontextual interference)control architecturemcontrol dilemmaon coordinationscortical areasaskcostacosts decisiontdecision making0TPdecision strategies, perceptions, cost-benefit theories, decision making, surveydecision-makingdedeclarative memoryesp decomposition deduction diagnosticity dimensionsyssdisappointmentysodiscriminationaskdistributed memoryydomain-specificor dopaminen$dorsolateral prefrontal cortexp dual-taskdual-task-performance dynamicstearly emotion1x emotion, cognitive control,785emotion, goal regulation, cognitive control, control,$emotion-cognition interactionserror-detectionomevent-related fmriexm evolutionaryrexecutive controlexecutive functionnslexecutive functions expectationseexpress saccadess expressioniol expressionsco eye-movements facialntafacial expressions0 failure feedbacki filling-inndnfixation position flexibilitync footshock force-fieldss forebrain formatorn frameworkfrontal eye fields sy frontal loben frontal lobesfrontal-lobe damage cfunctional reorganizationfunctional-anatomyrem goal neglectvgoal retrievaluppgoals heuristicsyoihigh-functioning adults honeybeeshuman amygdalafmrHuman Channel Capacityprohuman frontal-cortexm human-bodycep human-brainco humansionhypothalamic-stimulation imageryto implicitkimpression-formationnindividual-differences(( induction infarctsa inferior prefrontal cortex7 informationou    ##!!  Ov1Ariely, D. Zakay, D. 2001B;A timely account of the role of duration in decision makingActa Psychologica 108{2187-207 Sep%Ari&Zak01_ActaPsyc.pdfISI:000171270400007decision making; time; time discontinuity; time stress problem-solving strategies; combining experiences; risky choice; pressure; judgment; selection; satisfaction; consumption; behavior; velocityThe current work takes a general perspective on the role of time in decision making. There are many different relationships and interactions between time and decision making, and no single summary can do justice to this topic. In this paper we will describe a few of the aspects in which time and decision making are interleaved: (a) temporal perspectives of decisions - the various temporal orientations that decision-makers may adopt while making decisions, and the impact of such temporal orientations on the decision process and its outcomes; (b) time as a medium within which decisions take place - the nature of decision processes that occur along time; (c) time as a resource and as a contextual factor - the implications of shortage in time resources and the impact of time limits on decision making processes and performance; (d) time as a commodity - time as the subject matter of decision making. The paper ends with a few general questions on the role of duration in decision making. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science BN. All rights reserved.Times Cited: 4$://000171270400007$Bargh, J. A. Chartrand, T. L. 1999*$The unbearable automaticity of beingAmerican Psychologist547462-479 Jul%"BarghChartrand99_AmPsyc.pdf 2004-08-31ISI:000081470800002category accessibility; stereotype activation; impression-formation; limited resource; behavior; self; information; attitudes; consequences; judgmentsWhat was noted by E. J, Langer (1978) remains true today: that much of contemporary psychological research is based on the assumption that people are consciously and systematically processing incoming information in order to construe and interpret their world and to plan and engage in courses of action. As did E. J, Langer, the authors question this assumption. First, they review evidence that the ability to exercise such conscious, intentional control is actually quite limited, so that most of moment-to-moment psychological life must occur through nonconscious means if it is to occur at all. The authors then describe the different possible mechanisms that produce automatic, environmental control over these various phenomena and review evidence! establishing both the existence of these mechanisms as well as their consequences for judgments, emotions, and behavior. Three major forms of automatic self-regulation are identified: an automatic effect of perception on action automatic goal pursuit, and a continual automatic evaluation of one's experience. From the accumulating evidence, the authors conclude that these various nonconscious mental systems perform the lion's share of the self-regulatory burden, beneficently keeping the individual grounded in his or her current environment.0Times Cited: 199 (August 2004) A very interesting and readable paper. Used in in week 1 of my grad seminar on Dynamic Decision Making, Control of Cognition, and Emotion.$://000081470800002InQL Dolan, R. J. 2002& Emotion, cognition, and behaviorSciencej 298p 5596 1191-1194: Nov 8%Dolan02_Sci.pdf 2004-09-03ISI:000179080400032unilateral temporal lobectomy; skin-conductance responses; event-related fmri; human amygdala; prefrontal cortex; facial expressions; neural activity; declarative memory; major depression; decision-making4.Emotion is central to the quality and range of everyday human experience. The neurobiological substrates of human emotion are now attracting increasing interest within the neurosciences motivated, to a considerable extent, by advances in functional neuroimaging techniques. An emerging theme is the question of how emotion interacts with and influences other domains of cognition, in particular attention, memory, and reasoning. The psychological consequences and mechanisms underlying the emotional modulation of cognition provide the focus of this article.Times Cited: 32$://000179080400032c'Inst Neurol, Wellcome Dept Imaging Neurosci, London WC1N 3BG, England. Dolan, RJ, Inst Neurol, Wellcome Dept Imaging Neurosci, Queen Sq, London WC1N 3BG, England. Edwards, W. 1962F@Dynamic Decision-Theory and Probabilistic Information-Processing Human Factors4x2 59-73[% paper 2004-11-08ISI:A1962CGW7900001The development of a dynamic decision thoery will be central to the impending rapid expansion of reseach on human decision processes. Of a taxonomy of six decision problems, five require a dynamic theory in which the decision maker is assumed to make a sequence of decisions, basing decision n + 1 on what he learned from decision n and its consequences. Research in progress on information seeking, intuitive statistics, sequential prediction, and Bayesian information processing is reviewed to illustrate the kind of work needed. The relevance of mathematical developments in dynamiic programming and Bayesian statistics to dynamic decison theory is examined. A man-computer system for probabilistic processing of fallible military information is disscused in some detail as an application of these ideas and as a setting and motivator for future research on human information processing and decision making..'Times Cited: 125 Interesting in parts.$://A1962CGW7900001 Ekman, P. 1992Are There Basic EmotionsPsychological Review993550-553 Jul%Ekman92_PsycRvw.pdf 2004-09-16ISI:A1992JE92400010VOnervous-system activity; brain physiology; expression; contempt; imagery; angerOrtony and Turner's (1990) arguments against those who adopt the view that there are basic emotions are challenged. The evidence on universals in expression and in physiology strongly suggests that there is a biological basis to the emotions that have been studied. Ortony and Turner's reviews of this literature are faulted, and their alternative theoretical explanations do not fit the evidence. The utility of the basic emotions approach is also shown in terms of the research it has generated. <5Times Cited: 85 (Aug 2004) Used in seminar Fall 2004$://A1992JE92400010 Geisler, W. S. Kersten, D. 2002&Illusions, perception and BayestNature Neuroscience56508-510t Jun%Geisler&Kersten02_NN.pdfISI:000175874600005A new model shows that a range of visual illusions in humans can be explained as rational inferences about the odds that a motion stimulus on the retina results from a particular real-world source. Times Cited: 8 (Aug 2004)&$://000175874600005 @ 11OG N !"&(LQIPKJ,- 023 DF56 7:.;<= >@H/ABCd&> windwind@wind@pwind`winddmousmous hiob8hiobhiobPhiobPetrg etrg etrg/`cmds9cmds9Wacce,Iacce*acce) acce"! FCarlson, R. A. 2002D>Conscious intentions in the control of skilled mental activityLFPsychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory41191-228LEPsychology of Learning and Motivation-Advances in Research and Theory%Carlson02_L&Mchptr.pdf 2004-10-14ISI:000176862900005verbal reports; contextual interference; practice schedules; motor-skill; attention; memory; acquisition; performance; knowledge; implicit:4times cited: 0 (Aug 2004) Used in Fall 2004 seminar$://000176862900005,&Carver, Charles S. Scheier, Michael F. 1990TMOrigins and functions of positive and negative affect: A control-process view@Psychological Review971 19-350033295X%"Carver&Scheier90_PsycRvw.pdf 2004-09-06"emotion, cognitive control,{leThe question of how affect arises and what affect indicates is examined from a feedback-based viewpoint on self-regulation. Using the analogy of action control as the attempt to diminish distance to a goal, a second feedback system is postulated that senses and regulates the rate at which the action-guiding system is functioning. This second system is seen as responsible for affect. Implications of these assertions and issues that arise from them are addressed in the remainder of the article. Several issues relate to the emotion model itself; others concern the relation between negative emotion and disengagement from goals. Relations to 3 other emotion theories are also addressed. The authors conclude that this view on affect is a useful supplement to other theories and that the concept of emotion is easily assimilated to feedback models of self-regulation.:LFcited: 378 times (by Aug-2004) Used in my research seminar, Fall 2004Chaffin, D. B. 2002@9On simulating human reach motions for ergonomics analyses4-Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing123235-247 SumISI:000176168000001postureszMany existing job analysis tools for ergonomics have concentrated on the potential adverse effects of force, posture, and repetition, as these appear to be traditionally recognized risk factors in the workplace. Recent investigations have indicated that this pragmatic approach may be overly simplistic, and thus miss prediction of risk factors associated with certain motions. This article reviews some of the research under way in the University of Michigan's Human Motion Simulation Laboratory to develop a set of human motion prediction models. To produce these models, over 37,000 motions of 100 men and women from 18 to 78 years in age have been measured with a motion capture system. The motions are typical of people reaching and moving light to moderate load objects while either seated or standing. A 17-link kinematics model has been developed to resolve the dynamics of the motions. Thus far, initial motion algorithms have been developed that capture well over 95 h of the between participant repeatability. Advantages and limitations of the methods and data being used are discussed and illustrated. (C) 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Times Cited: 0 (Aug 2004)$://00017616800000160Chater, N. Oaksford, M. Nakisa, R. Redington, M. 2003F?Fast, frugal, and rational: How rational norms explain behavior:4Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes901 63-86 JanISI:000182312200005ptrace memory model; decision-making; cognitive architecture; noncompensatory models; individual-differences; symbolic model; likelihood; expectations; information; similarityMuch research on judgment and decision making has focussed on the adequacy of classical rationality as a description of human reasoning. But more recently it has been argued that classical rationality should also be rejected even as normative standards for human reasoning. For example, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) and Gigerenzer and Todd (1999a) argue that reasoning involves "fast and frugal" algorithms which are not justified by rational norms, but which succeed in the environment. They provide three lines of argument for this view, based on: (A) the importance of the environment; (B) the existence of cognitive limitations; and (C) the fact that an algorithm with no apparent rational basis, Take-the-Best, succeeds in an judgment task (judging which of two cities is the larger; based on lists of features of each city). We reconsider (A)-(C), arguing that standard patterns of explanation in psychology and the social and biological sciences, use rational norms to explain why simple cognitive algorithms can succeed. We also present new computer simulations that compare Take-the-Best with other cognitive models (which use connectionist, exemplar-based, and decision-tree algorithms). Although Take-the-Best still performs well, it does not perform noticeably better than the other models. We conclude that these results provide no strong reason to prefer Take-the-Best over alternative cognitive models. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.  Times Cited: 2 Review:$://000182312200005  information gainrinformation search0 inhibitionsncinhibitory controliat inner speech@ integrationea intentioninter-temporal choice interferencefinternal models joint control judgmentn judgments knowledge languagen learningilife-type situationsl lifespane likelihoododelimited resourcetlinear utility-modelslogic loss aversionmajor depressionr maskingon maximizationa meliorationnc memoryica mentalspe mental models mental setsnc metacontrastmetacontrast masking0model modulation an Monitoringakimoodi motivationsc-D@motor planning, statistical decision theory, judgment under risk motor-skillhe multiattribute binary choicemultiple-task performancenegative-symptomsnervous-system activityneural activityexneural mechanismsneural networkmor neuronsenneuropsychologynewcomb problemmanosiononcompensatory models((nondeficit formssobject identificationobstacle avoidanceati older-adultsd omission biasoptimal data selection(( optimizationc organism-environment systemon outcomesn overlapping neural systemshyparadox of active user((parietal corticesparkinsons-diseasel c patientsi perceptionmor performancetiPhysical Fitnessm pictureskpositive affect positron emission tomography positron-emission-tomographyeposterior parietal cortex posturesx potentiated startle paradigmpractice schedulesren predictionion preference($prefrontal cognitive-processespprefrontal cortex prefrontal cortex function7 prehensionyss preparationin preservationt pressuretprisoners-dilemmaprobabilistic choice0 probabilities probabilityioprobability judgmentProblem Solvinggm problem-solving strategiespti projectionsc-prospect-theoryse psychologyyty psychophysics psychophysiological analysisratturatio rationalorational choiceer rationalitytyratsvreaching movements0 recollectionoreconfiguratione reference pointso reflexsioreflex modification p regreton  reinforcementrepeated gamblese repetitionninrepresentationlla resourcesresponse propertiesza responsesretrospective evaluationsriskr risky choicel routinesirules saccadesrsaccadic eye-movementsss, satisfactionp scenese schedules schizophrenia searchion selectionselective attention a selective visual-attentionhyselfv self-controla sensitivityepsetplsetsa short-termhan similaritynsesimple associations0simple cognitive taskssingle neuronstex skin-conductance responsesomysmile sortingorspatial attention spinal-cordss statesl dstatistical propertiesonsstereotype activationstorystriate cortexask striatumasubjective-probabilityonssuperior colliculuse-support systemsbisymbolic modelfer syndrome'taskntask complexitytstask switchingupptask-switchingtiotestitimestime discontinuity0Time Managementgm time pressure time stresstiTourette's syndrome0tourettes-syndromensltrace memory model  trajectoriesstransient channelssza transition(transsaccadic memoryn Treatment uncertaintyty unilateral lenticulostriate7 unilateral temporal lobectomyutility-theoryyse velocityiverbal controluppverbal reports@ vision(1xvisual-attentionsvisual-perception visual-searchvisuospatial attentiontemworking memorytioworking-memorynomworld&$$Cooper, Richard Shallice, Tim 2000B;Contention scheduling and the control of routine activitiest Cognitive Neuropsychology;174297-338%$Cooper&Shallice00_CogNeuro.pdf 2004-10-10The control of routine action is a complex process subject both to minor lapses in normals and to more severe breakdown followingcertain forms of neurological damage.Anumber of recent empirical studies (e.g. Humphreys &Ford, 1998; Schwartz et al., 1991, 1995, 1998)have examined the details of breakdown in certain classes of patient, and attempted to relate the findings to existing psychological theory. This paper complements those studies by presenting a computational model of the selection of routine actions based on competitive activation within a hierarchically organised network of action schemas (cf. Norman & Shallice, 1980, 1986). Simulations are reported which demonstrate that the model is capable of organised sequential action selection in a complex naturalistic domain. It is further demonstrated that, after lesioning, the model exhibits behaviour qualitatively equivalent to that observed by Schwartz et al., in their action disorganisation syndrome patients. times cited: 21 (Aug 2004)B;Davis, D. G. S. Staddon, J. E. R. Machado, A. Palmer, R. G.[ 1993&The Process of Recurrent ChoicePsychological Review 1002320-341 Apr% DavisStaddon93_PsycRev.pdf 2004-08-23ISI:A1993KZ79600009^6/probabilistic choice; optimization; meliorationRecurrent choice has been studied for many years. A static law, matching, has been established, but there is no consensus on the underlying dynamic process. The authors distinguish between dynamic models in which the model state is identified with directly measurable behavioral properties (performance models) and models in which the relation between behavior and state is indirect (state models). Most popular dynamic choice models are local, performance models. The authors show that behavior in different types of discrimination-reversal experiments and in extinction is not explained by 2 versions of a popular local model and that the nonlocal cumulative-effects model is consistent with matching and that it can duplicate the major properties of recurrent choice in a set of discrimination-reversal experiments. The model can also duplicate results from several other experiments on extinction after complex discrimination training. Times Cited: 260$://A1993KZ79600009H@>> Turner, T. J. Ortony, A. 199282Basic Emotions - Can Conflicting Criteria ConvergePsychological Review993566-571 Jul%"Turner&Ortony92_PsycRvw.pdf 2004-09-16ISI:A1992JE924000132+brain physiology; expression; reflex; smilerlThe authors discuss some of the key points raised by Ekman (1992), Izard (1992), and Panksepp (1992) in their critiques of Ortony and Turner's (1990) suggestion that there are and probably can be no objective and generally acceptable criteria for what is to count as a basic emotion. A number of studies are discussed that are relevant to the authors' contention that a more promising approach to understanding the huge diversity among emotions is to think in terms of emotions being assemblages of basic components rather than combinations of other basic emotions. The authors stress that their position does not deny that emotions are based on "hardwired" biological systems. On the other hand, the existence of such systems does not mean that some emotions (such as those that appear on lists of basic emotions) have a special status. Finally, the authors note that Ekman, Izard, and Panksepp, in adopting different starting points for their research, arrive at rather different conclusions as to what basic emotions are and which emotions are basic. It is concluded that converging resolutions of these questions are improbable.60Times Cited: 12 (by Aug 2004) seminar Fall 2004$://A1992JE92400013 Vaughan, W. 1985 Choice - a Local Analysis60Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior433K383-405< 2004-11-04ISI:A1985AKX1100009>8Examines research relating to choice and reports that analyses of free-operant choice usually employ either simple concurrent procedure (i.e., a concurrent VI/VI schedule) or the concurrent-chains procedure (i.e., concurrently available initial links, each leading to an exclusively available terminal link), with theories regarding choice typically focusing on only 1 of the 2 procedures. In the present analysis, a form of the pairing hypothesis (according to which pairings between 1 stimulus and another affect the value of the 1st, and pairings between responses and reinforcers affect the value of the former) is used in a way that allows it to make qualitative predictions with regard to choice in a variety of simple concurrent and concurrent-chains procedures. The predictions include matching on concurrent VI/VI schedules, preference reversal in the self-control paradigm, and preference for tandem over chained terminal links. Untested predictions regarding the concurrent model are also discussed. (55 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2004 APA, all rights reserved) Times Cited: 56 (Aug 2004)$://A1985AKX1100009.'Wang, Hongbin Fan, Jin Johnson, Todd R. 20044.A symbolic model of human attentional networks Cognitive Systems Research5?119-134% WangFanJohnson04_CSRj.pdf2,An increasing body of evidence has shown that attention is a multi-type and multilevel cognitive faculty. The dominant computational modeling approaches to attention have often focused on one specific type of attention at one specific level. In particular, various connectionist modeling techniques at the subsymbolic level have been widely adopted. In this paper, we report a symbolic computational model of the Attentional Network Test, which simultaneously involves different types of attention (alerting, orienting, and executive control), each subserved by distinctive attentional networks in the brain. The model was developed in ACT-R, a rule-based cognitive architecture. The results show that the model, by sequentially firing rules at a rate of about one every 40 ms, was able to capture the effect of each attentional network. The model implies that while the attentional networks can be distinguished at both neuroanatomical and behavioral levels, different attentional networks may adopt similar computational operations at least at a symbolic rule level.0*Weiss, Y. Simoncelli, E. P. Adelson, E. H. 2002*$Motion illusions as optimal perceptsNature Neuroscience56598-604 Jun%WeissSim&Adel02_NN.pdfISI:000175874600021The pattern of local image velocities on the retina encodes important environmental information. Although humans are generally able to extract this information, they can easily be deceived into seeing incorrect velocities. We show that these 'illusions' arise naturally in a system that attempts to estimate local image velocity. We formulated a model of visual motion perception using standard estimation theory, under the assumptions that (i) there is noise in the initial measurements and (ii) slower motions are more likely to occur than faster ones. We found that specific instantiation of such a velocity estimator can account for a wide variety of psychophysical phenomena. Times Cited: 19 (Aug 2004)$://0001758746000216Oaksford, M. Chater, N. 2003@:Optimal data selection: Revision, review, and reevaluation$Psychonomic Bulletin & ReviewW102289-318 Jun% Oaksford&Chater03_PBR.pdfISI:000184477100003conditional inference; analytic processes; information gain; causal inference; task; rationality; model; probabilities; confirmation; decisionSince it first appeared, there has been much research and critical discussion on the theory of optimal data selection as an explanation of Wason's (1966, 1968) selection task (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). In this paper, this literature is reviewed, and the theory of optimal data selection is reevaluated in its light. The information gain model is first located in the current theoretical debate in the psychology of reasoning concerning dual processes in human reasoning. A model comparison exercise is then presented that compares a revised version of the model with its theoretical competitors. Tests of the novel predictions of the model are then reviewed. This section also reviews experiments claimed not to be consistent with optimal data selection. Finally, theoretical criticisms of optimal data selection are discussed. It is argued either that the revised model accounts for them or that they do not stand up under analysis. It is concluded that some version of the optimal data selection model still provides the best account of the selection task. Consequently, the conclusion of Oaksford and Chater's (1994) original rational analysis (Anderson, 1990), that people's hypothesis-testing behavior on this task is rational and well adapted to the environment, still stands.Times cited: 1 Review$://000184477100003Ortony, A. Turner, T. J. 1990& Whats Basic About Basic EmotionsPsychological Review973315-331 Jula%Ortony&Turner90_PR.pdf 2004-09-15ISI:A1990DN33800001A widespread assumption in theories of emotion is that there exists a small set of basic emotions. From a biological perspective, this idea is manifested in the belief that there might be neurophysiological and anatomical substrates corresponding to the basic emotions. From a psychological perspective, basic emotions are often held to be the primitive building blocks of other, nonbasic emotions. The content of such claims is examined, and the results suggest that there is no coherent nontrivial notion of basic emotions as the elementary psychological primitives in terms of which other emotions can be explained. Thus, the view that there exist basic emotions out of which all other emotions are built, and in terms of which they can be explained, is questioned, raising the possibility that this position is an article of faith rather than an empirically or theoretically defensible basis for the conduct of emotion research. This suggests that perhaps the notion of basic emotions will not lead to significant progress in the field. An alternative approach to explaining the phenomena that appear to motivate the postulation of basic emotions is presented.<6Times Cited: 147 Used this in my seminar -- Fall 2004$://A1990DN33800001  Lang, P. J. 1995>7The Emotion Probe - Studies of Motivation and AttentionAmerican Psychologist505372-385 May%Lang95_AmP.pdf 2004-09-23ISI:A1995QX57900004potentiated startle paradigm; reflex modification; anatomical analysis; memory; blink; modulation; footshock; behavior; pictures; ratEmotions are action dispositions-states of vigilant readiness that vary widely in reported affect, physiology, and behavior. They are driven, however, by only 2 opponent motivational systems, appetitive and aversive-subcortical circuits that mediate reactions to primary reinforcers. Using a large emotional picture library, reliable affective psychophysiologies are shown, defined by the judged valence (appetitive/pleasant or aversive/unpleasant) and arousal of picture percepts. Picture-evoked affects also modulate responses to independently presented startled probe stimuli. In other words, they potentiate startle reflexes during unpleasant pictures and inhibit them during pleasant pictures, and both effects are augmented by high picture arousal. Implications are elucidated for research in basic emotions, psychopathology, and theories of orienting and defense. Conclusions highlights both the approach's constraints and promising paths for future study. Times Cited: 228 (Aug 2004) p.372 "All emotions can be located in a two-dimensional space, as coordinates of affective valence and arousal." EMOTIONS ARE ACTION DISPOSITIONS p. 373 "It is likely that the varied shapes of emotions alluded to by James (1894) have evolved from simpler action tendencies. The behavior of very primitive organisms can be wholly characterized by two responsesa direct approach to appetitive stimuli and withdrawal from nociceptive stimuli (see Schneirla, 1959)." "It is clear that the contextual tactics of approach and avoidance have become more varied in humans; nevertheless, the strategic frame of appetite and aversion is no less relevant. Emotions are products of a Darwinian development and could be characterized as motivationally tuned states of readiness. In humans, the presumed indices of these "affects" include responses in three reactive systems: (a) expressive and evaluative language, (b) physiologic changes mediated by the somatic and autonomic systems, and (c) behavioral sequelae, such as patterns of avoidance or performance deficits. This is the database of emotion, and a theory of emotion must cope with its breadth and diversity." AFFECT VALENCE AND AROUSAL "Although emotional expression is highly varied, many theorists view its motivational basis as having a much simpler, two-factor organization." p.374 "It is proposed that two motive systems exist in the brainappetitive and aversiveaccounting for the primacy of the valence dimension. Arousal is not viewed as having a separate substrate, but rather, as reflecting variations in the activation (metabolic and neural) of either or both systems (see also Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). Tactical demands of context may variously shape affects. All affects are, however, organized around a motivational base. In this sense, valence and system arousal are the strategic dimensions of the emotion world." LOOKING AT PICTURES MOTIVATIONAL PRIMING p.377 "Emotions reflect the engagement of neural structures and pathways in either the appetitive or aversive motivation systems (e. g. as discussed above). During the period when this subcortical circuitry is active, a modulatory effect is exerted on the brain's other processing operations. Specifically, associations, representations, and action programs that are linked to the engaged motivational system have a higher probability of access (with a concomitantly greater potential output strength) than other information, and conversely, mental events and programs linked to the nonengaged system have a reduced probability and strength of activation." PROBING EMOTIONAL PERCEPTION p.379 "It is proposed that the startle reflex is differentially modulated depending on an individual's ongoing emotional state. More specifically, the amplitudes of blinks evoked by startle probes will vary with the valence of the affective state prompted by a foreground percept. In an unpleasant stimulus foreground the brain is processing negative affective information; the relevant subcortical, aversive system circuitry is contacted; and a defensive reflex is augmented. Appetitive and aversive/defensive dispositions are considered to be opponent states. That is, the active disposition (appetitive or aversive) controls the output processors, and affectively nonconcordant reflexes will not be potentiated and could actually be inhibited. Thus, when appetitive information is the focus of processing, the startle reflex is expected to show relative diminution." CONCLUSIONS , x $://A1995QX57900004(0320618240clipping.pctNBusemeyer, Jerome R. 2001Dynamic decision making+vpInternational encyclopedia of the social and behavioral sciences: Methodology, mathematics, and computer science  Amsterdam Pergamon%Busemeyer_DDM.pdf 2004-11-04This article reviews a specialty within the field of decision making known as dynamic decision making. Dynamic decisions are characterized by a decision maker choosing among various actions at different points in time in order to control and optimize the performance of a dynamic stochastic system. Realistic examples include fighting fires, navigational control, battlefield decisions, medical emergencies, and so on. The article has four parts. The first reviews basic theory concerning optimal control principles in a dynamic context; the second summarizes empirical approaches to the study of human performance on dynamic decision tasks; the third presents theoretical models, such as artificial neural network models or exemplar-based learning models, that describe how humans learn to control dynamic systems; and the last discusses methodological issues arising from the study of complex decisions including differences between field vs laboratory research.>7Busemeyer, Jerome R. Townsend, James T. Stout, Julie C.  2002|uMotivational underpinnings of utility in decision making: Decision field theory analysis of deprivation and satiation $Moore, Simon C. Oaksford, MikeEmotional cognition  Philadelphia $John Benjamins Publishing Co.197-219%BusemeyerT&S_chptr.pdf 2004-10-04PIThe purpose of this chapter is to build a theory of decision- making that attempts to identify some of the basic sources of subjective value or utility. In particular, we present a theory that formally describes how needs change over time as a function of external stimulation, and internal deprivation and consummation. Recent research demonstrating the influence of need states on decision- making is reviewed and earlier theoretical ideas on motivational mechanisms are summarized. A new extension of a dynamic model of decision making, called decision field theory, is presented that incorporates a dynamic model of needs. This extension is then applied to research examining the influence of affect and emotion on decision- making. Finally, a preliminary sketch of the neuro-physiological substrate of decision field theory is proposed.JCFairly readable. Basic idea is simple. Walks thru most of the math. -Herrnstein, R. J.G 1990*#Behavior, Reinforcement and UtilityPsychological Science1I4I217-224 Jul%Herrnstein90_PsycSci.pdf 2004-11-01ISI:A1990EG38600003piNotes that although the standard economic assumption about human behavior is that it optimizes overall utility, many controlled experiments (e.g., R. J. Herrnstein, 1961) on behavioral allocation have shown that organizations allocate their behavior so as to earn equal average rates of reinforcement from all alternatives. Equalizing average rates of reinforcement is a principle of allocation that generically violates the assumption of optimality. Implications for the matching law and for reconciling economics with behavioral psychology are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2004 APA, all rights reserved) Times Cited: 20 (Aug 2004)$://A1990EG38600003 Hudlicka, E. 2003NHTo feel or not to feel: The role of affect in human-computer interaction6/International Journal of Human-Computer Studies59 1-2 1-32 Jul%Hudlicka03_IJHCS.pdf 2004-09-26ISI:000183796400001affective HCI, affective computing, affect recognition, affect expression, affective user modeling emotion; mood; cognition; memoryThe past decade has witnessed an unprecedented growth in user interface and human-computer interaction (HCI) technologies and methods. The synergy of technological and methodological progress on the one hand, and changing user expectations on the other, are contributing to a redefinition of the requirements for effective and desirable human-computer interaction. A key component of these emerging requirements, and of effective HCI in general, is the ability of these emerging systems to address user affect. The objective of this special issue is to provide an introduction to the emerging research area of affective HCI, some of the available methods and techniques, and representative systems and applications. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.-,%Too high of a words-to-content ratio.3$://000183796400001 Izard, C. E. 1992PIBasic Emotions, Relations among Emotions, and Emotion Cognition RelationsPsychological Review993561-565g Jul%Izard92_PsycRvw.pdf 2004-09-16ISI:A1992JE92400012VOFrom the cognitive theory perspective that emotions are cognition dependent and contain cognitive components, Ortony and Turner (1990) questioned the validity of the concept of basic emotions. They argued that the so-called basic emotions were neither psychologically or biologically "primitive" nor "irreducible building blocks" for generating the "great variety of emotional experiences." In the biosocial theory tradition, researchers have identified multiple noncognitive activators of emotion and demonstrated the usefulness of defining the essential components of emotion as phenomena that do not require cognitive mediators or constituents. In this framework, emotions are seen as basic because their biological and social functions are essential in evolution and adaptation. Particular emotions are called basic because they are assumed to have innate neural substrates, innate and universal expressions, and unique feeling-motivational states. The great variety of emotional experiences is explained as a function of emotion-cognition interactions that result in affective-cognitive structures.B;Times Cited: 72 (by Aug 2004) Used in seminar -- Fall 2004$://A1992JE92400012 2G"Beach, L. R. Mitchell, T. R. 1978B://000170892100006yBCA/"West, R. F. Stanovich, K. E. 2003f_Is probability matching smart? Associations between probabilistic choices and cognitive abilityMemory & Cognition312@243-251 Mar%West&Stan03_M&C.pdf 2004-10-19ISI:000182531000007*piindividual-differences; rational choice; uncertainty; judgment; psychology; heuristics; selection; humans82In three experiments involving over 1,500 university students (n = 1,557) and two different probabilistic choice tasks, we found that the utility-maximizing strategy of choosing the most probable alternative was not the majority response. In a story problem version of a probabilistic choice task in which participants chose from among five different strategies, the maximizing response and the probability-matching response were each selected by a similar number of students (roughly 35% of the sample selected each). In a more continuous, or trial-by-trial, task, the utility-maximizing response was chosen by only one half as many students as the probability-matching response. More important, in both versions of the task, the participants preferring the utility-maximizing response were significantly higher in cognitive ability than were the participants showing a probability-matching tendency. Critiques of the traditional interpretation of probability matching as nonoptimal may well help explain why some humans are drawn to the nonmaximizing behavior of probability matching, but the traditional heuristics and biases interpretation can most easily accommodate the finding that participants high in computational ability are more likely to carry out the rule-based cognitive procedures that lead to maximizing behavior.:4Times Cited: 0 (Aug 2004) Used in seminar Fall 2004$://0001825310000074-Wolpert, D. M. Ghahramani, Z. Flanagan, J. R. 20012+Perspectives and problems in motor learning"Trends in Cognitive Sciences511487-494 Nov%"WolpertGhah&Flan01_TiCS.pdfISI:000171996500009internal models; reaching movements; arm movements; force-fields; spinal-cord; representation; dynamics; consolidation; decomposition; prediction6/Movement provides the only means we have to interact with both the world and other people. Such interactions can be hard-wired or learned through experience with the environment. Learning allows us to adapt to a changing physical environment as well as to novel conventions developed by society. Here we review motor learning from a computational perspective, exploring the need for motor learning,what is learned and how it is represented, and the mechanisms of learning. We relate these computational issues to empirical studies on motor learning in humans.*# Times Cited: 34 (Aug 2004) Review$://0001719965000094-Yechiam, Eldad Erev, I. Yehene, V. Gopher, D. 2003PIMelioration and the transition from touch-typing training to everyday use Human Factors454671-684 Win 2004-10-27ISI:000220059900014>7visual-search; performance; attention; feedback; choicepjPrevious research shows that success in touch-typing training does not ensure its continuation into everyday use. it is postulated that an important contributor to this problem is melioration-that is, maximizing local rates of reinforcement. In the context of typing, melioration implies an intuitive tendency to choose typing strategies that lead to a better immediate performance level than that obtained by touch-typing. One such strategy is visually guided typing, in which the performer looks at the keys to locate their position. The present research describes a training approach that changes the reinforcement structure by increasing the attractiveness of looking at the screen while typing. This approach is implemented by using a secondary task that requires typists to respond to signals appearing on the screen. In an experiment that evaluated this solution, 22 students were given a touch-typing training course followed by a period in which they had to type their own homework. The results showed that under a modified reinforcement condition, the effect of melioration on touch-typing scores in the posttraining phase decreased. In addition, the experimental manipulation facilitated the acquisition and maintenance of the touch-typing skill. Actual or potential applications of this research include research in training, choice behavior, and human-computer interaction.Times Cited: 0$://000220059900014*$Yechiam, Eldad Erev, Ido Parush, Avi 2004d^Easy First Steps and Their Implication to the Use of a Mouse-Based and a Script-Based Strategy2+Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied102 89-96%YecErePar04_JEP-A.pdf 2004-10-25paradox of active uservpThe present study evaluated the convention to design training environments by giving access to easy strategies first and progressing to more difficult and efficient strategies thereafter. An experiment was conducted focusing on training in a simplified editing task. This task could be performed with an easy (mouse-based) strategy as well as with a more efficient (script-based) strategy. Two learning environments were compared, based on the order of the introduction of the following 2 strategies to participants: an easy-first program and a difficult-first program. The results highlight 2 interesting patterns. First, initial training in an easy strategy impaired the acquisition of a more efficient strategy. Second, learning the easy strategy first reduced between-subjects variability. It helped poor performers but resulted in a lower proportion of high-level performers.tmFu&Gray 2004 -- paradox of active user Interesting paper. The intro was more interesting in some respects than the actual studies. They seemed to be disappointingly contrived and boring. ********************** p.89 Limits to "easy-first" learning strategies such as "training wheels" Argument seems to be: A. learning goes from controlled processes to automatic processes. B. becoming automatic requires effort (at least a lot of time on task) C. therefore Ss resist investing new effort into learning a more difficult strategy wdg -- intuitive I guess, but seems weak and "besides the point" as no data on this was presented in this study More to the point is: "Moreover, in this setting, easy-first training creates a problematic incentive structure in which initial attempts to master the difficult-but-efficient strategies are associated with a drop in performance."  Panksepp, J. 1992`ZA Critical Role for Affective Neuroscience in Resolving What Is Basic About Basic EmotionsPsychological Review993554-560i Jul%Panksepp92_PsycRvw.pdf 2004-09-16ISI:A1992JE92400011xqhypothalamic-stimulation; brain; projections; responses; behavior; rats; motivation; forebrain; dopamine; neuronsOrtony and Turner (1990) asked "What's Basic About Basic Emotions," and they concluded "very little," They proceeded to advocate a "componential" or "mosaic" view of how emotional systems should be analyzed. Their thesis was flawed by their failure to consider the available neurobehavioral data. Genetically dictated brain systems that mediate affective-emotional processes do exist, even though there are bound to be semantic ambiguities in how we speak about these systems. This commentary summarizes key lines of evidence for coherently operating emotional systems in the brain and advocates the position that the issue of basic emotions can no longer be credibly discussed without adequate consideration of the relevant brain research in the area. The type of conceptual, logical analysis pursued by Ortony and Turner, in the absence of a thorough analysis of the available neurological data, is not an adequate basis for resolving what is basic about basic emotions.4-Times Cited: 28 (Aug 2004) seminar Fall 2004$://A1992JE92400011:"Shin, J. C. Rosenbaum, D. A. 2002XRReaching while calculating: Scheduling of cognitive and perceptual-motor processes0*Journal of Experimental Psychology-General 1312206-219 Jun%ShinRosenb04_JEPG.pdf 2004-11-22ISI:000175735000004VOmultiple-task performance; computational theory; information; resources; memoryB;To address the neglected question of how cognitive and perceptual-motor processes are coordinated, the authors asked participants to move a cursor from one target to another to reveal operators and operands for a running arithmetic task. In Experiment I performance on this task was compared with performance on tasks requiring only aiming or only arithmetic. Aiming was faster in the aiming-only task than in the combined task. More importantly, times for steps requiring calculation were equivalent in the combined and arithmetic-only tasks. The results from this and a second experiment suggest that participants slowed their aiming to allow calculations to be completed before subsequent targets were entered. As a whole, the results suggest that cognitive and perceptual-motor processes are coordinated through scheduling.t Times Cited: 1I$://000175735000004Simon, Herbert A. 196760Motivational and emotional controls of cognitionPsychological Review74 29-39%Simon67_PsycRvw.pdfH 2004-09-06emotionThe central nervous system is a serial info processor that must serve an organism endowed with multiple needs, and living in an envrionment that presents unpredictable threats and opportunities. These requirements are met by 2 mechanisms: (a) goal-terminating mechanisms, permitting goals to be processed serially without any 1 monopolizing the processor, (b) interrruption mechanism, having the properties usually ascribed to emotion, allowing the processor to respond to urgent needs in real time. Mechanisms of these kinds, to control the direction of attention and activity, have been incorporated in some information-processing theories of human cognition, and their further elaboration will permit these theories ot explaiin wider ranges of behavior.$cited: 197 times (by Aug-2004)320 Kahneman, D. 2003HBA perspective on judgment and choice - Mapping bounded rationalityAmerican Psychologistx589J697-720 Sep%Kahneman03_AmPsy.pdf 2004-09-29ISI:000185941100001conjunction fallacy; decision-making; retrospective evaluations; subjective-probability; statistical properties; repeated gambles; prospect-theory; abstract ideas; utility-theory; loss aversionTNEarly studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view Of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful. times cited: 3 (Aug 2003) see keynote file for class on 5th week of semster, Fall 2004. Kahneman: Intuition & Accessibility -- The 2-system view The Two-System View Highly accessible impressions produced by System 1 control judgments and preferences, unless modified or overridden by the deliberate operations of System 2. This template sets an agenda for research: we must study the determinants of high accessibility, the conditions under which System 2 overrides or corrects System 1, and the rules of these corrective operations Much is known about the determinants of accessibility, but there is no general theoretical account of accessibility and no prospect of one emerging soon In the context of research in judgment and decision making, however, the lack of a theory does little damage to the usefulness of the concept In this respect, the conceptual status of the principles of accessibility resembles that of Gestalt principles of perceptual grouping, which are often invoked, both implicitly and explicitly, in the planning of research and in the interpretation of results What matters is that empirical generalizations about the determinants of differential accessibility are widely accepted and that there are accepted procedures for testing the validity of particular hypotheses Conditions under which System 2 overrides or corrects System 1 System 2 is vulnerable to interference by competing activities Manifestations of intuitive thought that are normally inhibited by System 2 will be expressed when people are placed under cognitive load Rules of corrective operations accessibility determine the relative power of the cues to which the monitoring functions of System 2 respond 5 ways to make a judgment or choice: 1. An intuitive judgment or intention is initiated, and (a) Endorsed by System 2; (b) Adjusted (insufficiently) for other features that are recognized as relevant; (c) Corrected (sometimes overcorrected) for an explicitly recognized bias; or (d) Identified as violating a subjectively valid rule and blocked from overt expression. 2. No intuitive response comes to mind, and the judgment is computed by System 2. 2 major hypotheses Most behavior is intuitive, skilled, unproblematic, and successful Behavior is likely to be anchored in intuitive impressions and intentions even when it is not completely dominated by them. An essay with a related message (Haidt, 2001) suggested the image of the intuitive dog wagging the rational tail$://000185941100001Kerstholt, Jose H. 1995ZTDecision making in a dynamic situation: The effect of false alarms and time pressure,%Journal of Behavioral Decision Making8u3u181-200 Sep*/1996-10294-001/*a priori probability of false alarms & time pressure, decision making behavior, college students Decision Making Probability Judgment Time Management Athletes Physical Fitness TreatmentyInvestigated the effect of a priori probability of false alarms and time pressure on decision-making behavior in a dynamic task environment. The task was modeled mathematically, and actual decision strategies were compared to the optimal ones. 30 college students were required to monitor the fitness level of a stimulated athlete, and provide treatment whenever the athlete's fitness level suggested a real physiological problem. Results indicate that when the a priori probability of false alarms increased, Ss waited longer before they started their trouble shooting process, but maintained the same intervention level across time pressure conditions. Regardless of the probability of false alarms and time pressure, the dominant strategy was judgment-oriented, rather than action-oriented, which was financially more useful. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved)1jd Times Cited: 4 0894-3257, Print 1099-0771, Electronic English Journal Article (250) Print (Paper)LEKerstholt, Jose H. Passenier, Peter O. Houttuin, Kees Schuffel, Herke 1996hbThe effect of a priori probability and complexity on decision making in a supervisory control task Human FactorsG381 65-78 Mar*/1996-04763-005/*complexity & a priori probability of disturbances, monitoring & decision making abilities in a ship control task, 18-22 yr olds, Netherlands Decision Making Monitoring Probability Judgment Problem Solving Task Complexity Human Channel CapacityInvestigated how monitoring and fault management in a ship control task are affected by complexity and a priori probability of disturbances. 24 18-22 yr old Dutch maritime training students were required to supervise 4 independent shipping subsystems and to make adjustments whenever deviations occurred. In order to apply the correct action, Ss first had to diagnose the cause of the deviation by requesting further subsystem information. Complexity and a priori probability were manipulated by varying the number of disturbances occurring simultaneously and the disturbance rates over subsystems. Overall results indicate that the Ss ignored the monitoring function when diagnosing a disturbance. With increasing disturbances, "cognitive lock-up" was observed, in which Ss tend to concentrate on single disturbances while ignoring the rest of the system. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved)Etimes cited: 4,JKGray, Jeremy R. 20042,Integration of emotion and cognitive control2+Current Directions in Psychological Science132 46-48 Apr%grayj04_CDPsySc.pdf 2004-09-19ISI:000220831900002<6emotion-cognition interactions; control dilemma statesEmotion is easily typecast as the nemesis of self-control. However, recent advances suggest a more nuanced view in which emotion and cognitive control are integrated, at times working in harmony. Emotional states can enhance high-level cognition, and can modulate the neural mechanisms that support cognitive control. Such an integrated neural organization might be adaptive: Emotional states could help resolve control dilemmas, facilitating the transition of the whole system into a more unified, situationally appropriate control state. This perspective is intriguing because control dilemmas are pervasive in human affairs (e.g., balancing risk vs. reward, short-term vs. long-term effects, and personal advantage vs. group advantage). Although many challenging questions remain, understanding emotion-cognition interactions at multiple levels Of analysis is a realistic and exciting scientific goal. Times Cited: 0 (Aug 2004)/$://000220831900002p'Yale Univ, Dept Psychol, New Haven, CT 06520 USA. Gray, JR, Yale Univ, Dept Psychol, Box 208205, New Haven, CT 06520 USA. jeremy.gray@yale.edu Hayhoe, M. 2000<5Vision using routines: A functional account of visionVisual Cognition7 1-3v 4364Jan-mar Vis. Cogn.%Hayhoe00_VisCog.pdf 2001-01-21ISI:000085278400003{This paper presents the case for a functional account of vision. A variety of studies have consistently revealed "change blindness" or insensitivity to changes in the visual scene during an eye movement. These studies indicate that only a small part of the information in the scene is represented in the brain from moment to moment. It is still unclear, however, exactly what is included in visual representations. This paper reviews experiments using an extended visuo-motor task, showing that display changes affect performance differently depending on the observer's place in the task. These effects are revealed by increases in fixation duration following a change. Different task-dependent increases suggest that the visual system represents only the information that is necessary for the immediate visual task. This allows a principled exploration of the stimulus properties that are included in the internal visual representation. The task specificity also has a more general implication that vision should be conceptualized as an active process executing special purpose "routines" that compute only the currently necessary information. Evidence for this view and its implications for visual representations are discussed. Comparison of the change blindness phenomenon and fixation durations shows that conscious report does not reveal the extent of the representations computed by the routines.LE Times Cited: 21 (as of 2004-08-17) excellent article, well-written.$://000085278400003(!Henderson, J. M. Hollingworth, A.s 2003VOEye movements and visual memory: Detecting changes to saccade targets in scenes Perception & Psychophysics651 58-71 JanISI:000181644000005object identification; transsaccadic memory; fixation position; working-memory; perception; world; information; attention; representation; integrationSaccade-contingent change detection provides a powerful tool for investigating scene representation and scene memory. In the present study, critical objects presented within color images of naturalistic scenes were changed during a saccade toward or away from the target. During the saccade, the critical object was changed to another object type, to a visually different token of the same object type, or was deleted from the scene. There were three main results. First, the deletion of a saccade target was special: Detection performance for saccade target deletions was very good, and this level of performance did not decline with the amplitude of the saccade. In contrast, detection of type and token changes at the saccade target, and of all changes including deletions at a location that had just been fixated but was not the saccade target, decreased as the amplitude of the saccade increased. Second, detection performance for type and token changes, both when the changing object was the target of the saccade and when the object had just been fixated but was not the saccade target, was well above chance. Third, mean gaze durations were reliably elevated for those trials in which the change was not overtly detected. The results suggest that the presence of the saccade target plays a special role in transsaccadic integration, and together with other recent findings, suggest more generally that a relatively rich scene representation is retained across saccades and stored in visual memory. Times Cited: 40$://000181644000005;."Stanovich, K. E. West, R. F. 1999ztDiscrepancies between normative and descriptive models of decision making and the understanding acceptance principleCognitive Psychology383349-385 May%Stan&Wes99_CogPsyc.pdf 2004-10-19ISI:000080230900001*base-rate fallacy; probability judgment; prisoners-dilemma; newcomb problem; risky choice; information; diagnosticity; uncertainty; rationality; psychologySeveral tasks from the heuristics and biases literature were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky's (1974) understanding/acceptance principle-that the deeper the understanding of a normative principle, the greater the tendency to respond in accord with it. The principle was instantiated both correlationally and experimentally. An individual differences version was used to examine whether individuals higher in tendencies toward reflective thought and in cognitive ability would be more likely to behave normatively. In a second application of the understanding/acceptance principle, subjects were presented with arguments both for and against normative choices and it was observed whether, on a readministration of the task, performance was more likely to move in a normative direction. Several discrepancies between performance and normative models could be explained by the understanding/acceptance principle. However, several gaps between descriptive and normative models (particularly those deriving from some noncausal base rate problems) were not clarified by the understanding/acceptance principle-they could not be explained in terms of varying task understanding or tendencies toward reflective thought. The results demonstrate how the variation and instability in responses can be analyzed to yield inferences about why descriptive and normative models of human reasoning and decision making sometimes do not coincide. (C) 1999 Academic Press.0Times Cited: 13E$://0000802309000012+Thornton, I. M. Rensink, R. A. Shiffrar, M. 2002<5Active versus passive processing of biological motion Perception317837-8530%TH_R_S02_Perc.pdf 2004-10-11ISI:000177276600007b\apparent motion; visual-perception; human-body; sensitivity; routines; patient; search; taskJohansson's point-light walker figures remain one of the most powerful and convincing examples of the role that motion can play in the perception of form (Johansson, 1973 Perception & Psychophysics 14 201-211; 1975 Scientific American 232(6) 76-88). In the current work, we use a dual-task paradigm to explore the role of attention in the processing of such stimuli. In two experiments we find striking differences in the degree to which direction-discrimination performance in point-light walker displays appears to rely on attention. Specifically, we find that performance in displays thought to involve top-down processing, either in time (experiment 1) or space (experiment 2) is adversely affected by dividing attention. In contrast, dividing attention has little effect on performance in displays that allow low-level, bottom-up computations to be carried out. We interpret these results using the active/passive motion distinction introduced by Cavanagh (1991 Spatial Vision 5 303-309).G:4Times Cited: 7 (Aug 2004) Used in seminar Fall 2004$://000177276600007:7TRensink, R. A. 2000RKVisual search for change: A probe into the nature of attentional processingVisual Cognition7 1-3;345-376Jan-Mar%Rensink00_VisCog.pdf 2004-12-14ISI:000085278400020memory; vision; noA set of visual search experiments tested the proposal that focused attention is needed to detect change. Displays were arrays of rectangles, with the target being the item that continually changed its orientation or contrast polarity. Five aspects of performance were examined: linearity of response, processing time, capacity, selectivity, and memory trace. Detection of change was found to be a self-terminating process requiring a time that increased linearly with the number of items in the display. Capacity for orientation was found to be about five items, a value comparable to estimates of attentional capacity. Observers were able to filter out both static and dynamic variations in irrelevant properties. Analysis also indicated a memory for previously attended locations. These results support the hypothesis that the process needed to detect change is much the same as the attentional process needed to detect complex static patterns. Interestingly, the features of orientation and polarity were found to be handled in somewhat different ways. Taken together, these results not only provide evidence that focused attention is needed to see change, but also show that change detection itself can provide new insights into the nature of attentional processing.e Times Cited: 39 (Aug 2004)$://000085278400020"Shin, J. C. Rosenbaum, D. A. 2002XRReaching while calculating: Scheduling of cognitive and perceptual-motor processes0*Journal of Experimental Psychology-General 1312206-219 Jun%ShinRosenb04_JEPG.pdf 2004-11-22ISI:000175735000004VOmultiple-task performance; computational theory; information; resources; memoryB;To address the neglected question of how cognitive and perceptual-motor processes are coordinated, the authors asked participants to move a cursor from one target to another to reveal operators and operands for a running arithmetic task. In Experiment I performance on this task was compared with performance on tasks requiring only aiming or only arithmetic. Aiming was faster in the aiming-only task than in the combined task. More importantly, times for steps requiring calculation were equivalent in the combined and arithmetic-only tasks. The results from this and a second experiment suggest that participants slowed their aiming to allow calculations to be completed before subsequent targets were entered. As a whole, the results suggest that cognitive and perceptual-motor processes are coordinated through scheduling.t Times Cited: 1I$://000175735000004Simon, Herbert A. 196760Motivational and emotional controls of cognitionPsychological Review74 29-39%Simon67_PsycRvw.pdfH 2004-09-06emotionThe central nervous system is a serial info processor that must serve an organism endowed with multiple needs, and living in an envrionment that presents unpredictable threats and opportunities. These requirements are met by 2 mechanisms: (a) goal-terminating mechanisms, permitting goals to be processed serially without any 1 monopolizing the processor, (b) interrruption mechanism, having the properties usually ascribed to emotion, allowing the processor to respond to urgent needs in real time. Mechanisms of these kinds, to control the direction of attention and activity, have been incorporated in some information-processing theories of human cognition, and their further elaboration will permit these theories ot explaiin wider ranges of behavior.$cited: 197 times (by Aug-2004)nfo is present and must be inferred by the Ss. T&S say "Nonetheless, over long periods of training we might still expect participants to learn the probability of reinforcement and how it was contingent upon their behaivor. Yet Experiments 2 and 3 provide little evidence of this: it is hard to detect any evidence of learning in these experiments (see Exhibit 8). Thus it is not obvious that Herrnstein et al's. explanation is appropriate." WDG: This is an assertion, not an argument. Why not appropriate? p. 309 Last sentence of the paper "We conclude that choice in the Harvard Game is, like probability matching . . . an example of a choice anomaly that is heavily context dependent and which can be made to disappear under appropriate conditions." WDG: How can they claim to have shown this???!!   D 3      $://000178836700002O5F~D Mazur, J. E. 1996LEPast experience, recency, and spontaneous recovery in choice behaviorK Animal Learning & Behavior241 1-10 Feb%Mazur96_AnLrng&Beh.pdf 2004-11-04ISI:A1996TU97200001\Vtransition; preference; model; reinforcement; melioration; honeybees; schedules; ratioPigeons' responses on two keys were recorded before and after the percentage of reinforcers delivered by each key was changed. In each condition of Experiment 1, the reinforcement percentage for one key was 50% for several sessions, then either 70% or 90% for one, two, or three sessions, and then 50% for another few sessions. At the start of the second and third sessions after a change in reinforcement percentages, choice percentages often exhibited spontaneous recovery-a reversion to the response percentages of earlier sessions. The spontaneous recovery consisted of a shift toward a more extreme response percentage in some cases and toward a less extreme response percentage in other cases, depending on what reinforcement percentages were previously in effect. In Experiment 2, some conditions included a 3-day rest period before a change in reinforcement percentages, and other conditions included no such rest days. Slightly less spontaneous recovery was observed in conditions with the rest periods, suggesting that the influence of prior sessions diminished with the passage of time. The results are consistent with the view that choice behavior at the start of a new session is based on a weighted average of the events of the past several sessions.Times Cited: 18a$://A1996TU97200001',%mazurj1@southernct.edu 203) 392-6876("Mellers, B. Schwartz, A. Ritov, I. 1999Emotion-based choice0*Journal of Experimental Psychology-General 1283332-345 Sep% MellersSchRit99_JEP-G.pdf 2004-09-29ISI:000082746100005zdecision-making; positive affect; uncertainty; regret; disappointment; outcomes; probability; behavior; mood; consequencesIn this article the authors develop a descriptive theory of choice using anticipated emotions. People are assumed to anticipate how they will feel about the outcomes of decisions and use their predictions to guide choice. The authors measure the pleasure associated with monetary outcomes of gambles and offer an account of judged pleasure called decision affect theory. Then they propose a theory of choices between gambles based on anticipated pleasure. People are assumed to choose the option with greater subjective expected pleasure. Similarities and differences between subjective expected pleasure theory and subjective expected utility theory are discussed.IHBTimes Cited: 43 (Aug 2004) Used in seminar, fall 2004 -- 5th week$://000082746100005Oaksford, M. Chater, N. 20014-The probabilistic approach to human reasoning"Trends in Cognitive Sciences58349-357 Aug%Oak&Cha01_TICS.pdf 2004-11-15ISI:000170330200006optimal data selection; conditional inference; mental models; rational analysis; information gain; task; cognition; deduction; logic; brainA recent development in the cognitive science of reasoning has been the emergence of a probabilistic approach to the behaviour observed on ostensibly logical tasks. According to this approach the errors and biases documented on these tasks occur because people import their everyday uncertain reasoning strategies into the laboratory. Consequently participants' apparently irrational behaviour is the result of comparing it with an inappropriate logical standard. In this article, we contrast the probabilistic approach with other approaches to explaining rationality, and then show how it has been applied to three main areas of logical reasoning: conditional inference, Wason's selection task and syllogistic reasoning.:60 Times Cited: 16 Used in grad seminar Fall 2004$://000170330200006P& Gratch, Jonathan Marsella, Stacy 2004:3A domain-independent framework for modeling emotion Cognitive Systems Research% GratchMarsella04_CSRj.pdf 2004-09-28In this article, we show how psychological theories of emotion shed light on the interaction between emotion and cognition, and thus can inform the design of human-like autonomous agents that must convey these core aspects of human behavior. We lay out a general computational framework of appraisal and coping as a central organizing principle for such systems. We then discuss a detailed domain-independent model based on this framework, illustrating how it has been applied to the problem of generating behavior for a significant social training application. The model is useful not only for deriving emotional state, but also for informing a number of the behaviors that must be modeled by virtual humans such as facial expressions, dialogue management, planning, reacting, and social understanding. Thus, the work is of potential interest to models of strategic decision-making, action selection, facial animation, and social intelligence. : 3Interesting article. An AI-based attempt to incorporate "appraisal theory" into a cognitive account of emotions. 2. THEORETICAL FRAME WORK 2.1 The cognitive-motivational-emotive system 2.1.1 Appraisal and appraisal variables p.5 "Appraisal theories posit that events do not have significance in of themselves, but only by virtue of their interpretation in the context of an individuals beliefs, desires, intentions and abilities." 4. EMOTION AND COPING 4.5 COPING 4.5.3. Mixed coping strategies and consistency p.23 "terms. One can view coping as an alternative, psychologically motivated calculus for updating subjective probabilities and utilities." 6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 6.3. Relationship to classical decision theory p.31 "A purely decision-theoretic approach argues for a view where desirability and likelihood are the only dimensions along which events should be appraised. In contrast, appraisal theories posit that additional dimensions (e.g., attributions of blame or credit) are critical for characterizing human behavior. In this sense, decision theory provides a useful, but incomplete, set of constructs for modeling human behavior, and may be incomplete from the perspective of modeling intelligent behavior in general, independent of its humanness." "Thus, EMA distinguishes actions with strong positive and negative outcomes from actions that have only neutral outcomes, whereas a traditional application of decision theory would treat these actions the same." "Thus, EMA can mimic standard framing effects whereby how one presents information in- fluences its evaluation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), something classical decision-theory cannot account for." "Finally, appraisal theory argues for a re-evaluation of how the concept of rationality is applied to the assessment of human behavior. For example, in using emotion-focused coping strategies, people distort their beliefs for emotionally convenient reasons, yet these irrational distortions can be highly adaptive, decreasing stress levels, extending life expectancy, enhancing the strength of social relationships. This adaptive nature of emotional behavior may be attributed to the fact that such coping strategies attempt to form a comprehensive response that balances the global physical and social consequences of individual beliefs and decisions. In other words, the common complaint that people are irrational may be more a statement about the artificially narrow inputs to our rational models, rather than the mal-adaptiveness of human decision-making." 6.7. Physiological substrate "We have modeled the cognitive components of emotion." 7. CONCLUSIONS p. 35 "Three aspects of human emotional behavior have heavily influenced our approach to computational modeling of emotion. First, emotion is an organizing principle of human behavior, both influenced by, and influencing in return, a wide range of cognitive and physical behaviors. Second, emotion is central to adaptive behavior and adaptive behavior is more than just immediate actions in the world. People adapt their beliefs, goals and plans and emotion plays a central role here as well. Finally, emotion, and the behaviors it influences, operates over the past, present and future." "These requirements lead us to a computational model of emotion that is tied to an individuals causal interpretation of the world."=<2+Trommershauser, J. Maloney, L. T. Landy, M. 2003RKStatistical decision theory and trade-offs in the control of motor responseSpatial Vision16 3-4255-275%TromM&L03_SV.pdf 2004-11-22ISI:000184269100005motor planning, statistical decision theory, judgment under risk obstacle avoidance; arm movements; joint control; model; psychophysics; coordination; trajectories; sensitivity; dimensions; prehensionWe present a novel approach to the modeling of motor responses based on statistical decision theory. We begin with the hypothesis that subjects are ideal motion planners who choose movement trajectories to minimize expected loss. We derive predictions of the hypothesis for movement in environments where contact with specified regions carries rewards or penalties. The model predicts shifts in a subject's aiming point in response to changes in the reward and penalty structure of the environment and with changes in the subject's uncertainty in carrying out planned movements. We tested some of these predictions in an experiment where subjects were rewarded if they succeeded in touching a target region on a computer screen within a specified time limit. Near the target was a penalty region which, if touched, resulted in a penalty. We varied distance between the penalty region and the target and the cost of hitting the penalty region. Subjects shift their mean points of contact with the computer screen in response to changes in penalties and location of the penalty region relative to the target region in qualitative agreement with the predictions of the hypothesis. Thus, movement planning takes into account extrinsic costs and the subject's own motor uncertainty.t  Times Cited: 2 (Aug 2004)$://000184269100005)"Tunney, R. J. Shanks, D. R. 2002:3A re-examination of melioration and rational choice,%Journal of Behavioral Decision Making154@291-311 Oct%Tun&Sha02_JBDM.pdf 2004-10-24ISI:000178836700002choice; inter-temporal choice; melioration; maximization; self-control; rationality; learning; reinforcement self-control; reinforcement; probability; schedulesXQWe examined how people allocate choices between two alternatives when the payoff from each alternative varied as a function of the allocation of recent choices. On any one trial alternative A had a higher immediate payoff than alternative B, but across all trials B had a higher overall payoff than A. Rational choice theory requires that participants allocate all their responses to the alternative with the greatest overall payoff irrespective of which has the higher immediate payoff. Melioration, in contrast, proposes that participants are motivated to choose the alternative with the higher immediate payoff, irrespective of the consequences for future returns. We report four experiments in which we varied the nature of the payoffs. Participants exhibited self-control consistent with rational choice theory when payoffs varied in magnitude, but exhibited impulsiveness consistent with melioration when the payoffs varied in probability. Finally, we show that impulsivity when payoffs varied in probability can be overcome following un-reinforced practice. Copyright (C) 2002 John Wiley Sons, Ltd. n Times Cited: 0 (Aug 2004) p.294 Situations in which the consequences of making choices are unknown or have not been experienced present a twofold problem: the payoff schedules associated with each choice must be learned before choices can be allocated strategically." "Similarly, Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) note that before we conclude that human behavior is 'irrational' we must be sure that the rewards associated with optimal and sub-optimal equilibria are sufficiently different that the utility of adopting an optimal strategy is greater than the cost of finding that strategy." p.295 "Clearly the structure of the task influences how easy it is for subjects to maximize their overall payoff. Self-control is easier to learn when complete abstinence is required than when it requires a more subtle redistribution behavior." "Receiving payoffs alone may do little more than indicate how well a participant is doing. In order to make choices that maximize payoffs poeple may need to be informed of how well they could be doing (Balzer, Doherty, and O'Connor, 1989)." Present us with 4 studies. Vary magnitude of reward in e1 and probability of reward in e2-4. In e3 add negative reward. In e4 is same as e3 but give Ss 100 trials to play around with without penalty. Make a few wild and crazy claims in their GENERAL DISCUSSION section: p.308 Admit to having small sample sizes and evidence of individual differences (they pull out the number of Ss who show max vs melioration -- nicely done), but because they found some trend over blocks in 3/4 of their studies they say, "We conclude from this that any individual differences there may have been reflect differences in the rate at which participants learned the payoff schedules, rather than differences in strategy." Later they discuss Herrnstein's study that compared a fixed magnitude payoff with varying delays vs a fixed delay with varying magnitude payoffs. Those in the fixed delay--varying magnitude condition maximized 70% of the time, those in the "fixed magnitude--varying delay" maximized 22%. Herrnstein observed that allocating choices in the magnitude condition was relatively easier than in the delay condition. His explained this in terms of cognitive workload -- in the FD-VM condition the first step "is provided by the apparatus" i.e., the immediate consequences of behavior are readily apparent to the Ss on the screen in numerical form. For FM-VD no such info is present and must be inferred by the Ss. T&S say "Nonetheless, over long periods of training we might still expect participants to learn the probability of reinforcement and how it was contingent upon their behaivor. Yet Experiments 2 and 3 provide little evidence of this: it is hard to detect any evidence of learning in these experiments (see Exhibit 8). Thus it is not obvious that Herrnstein et al's. explanation is appropriate." WDG: This is an assertion, not an argument. Why not appropriate? p. 309 Last sentence of the paper "We conclude that choice in the Harvard Game is, like probability matching . . . an example of a choice anomaly that is heavily context dependent and which can be made to disappear under appropriate conditions." WDG: How can they claim to have shown this???!!   D 3      $://000178836700002OInQL(6.'Di Lollo, V. Enns, J. T. Rensink, R. A. 2000hbCompetition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes0*Journal of Experimental Psychology-General 1294481-507 Dec%DiLEnnRen00_JEP-G.pdf 2004-12-16ISI:000165458500009zmetacontrast masking; striate cortex; cortical areas; attention; search; integration; feedback; model; cat; discriminationAdvances in neuroscience implicate reentrant signaling as the predominant form of communication between brain areas. This principle was used in a series of masking experiments that defy explanation by feed-foward theories. The masking occurs when a brief display of target plus mask is continued with the mask alone. Two masking processes were found: an early process affected by physical factors such as adapting luminance and a later process affected by attentional factors such as set size. This later process is called masking by object substitution, because it occurs whenever there is a mismatch between the reentrant visual representation and the ongoing lower level activity. Iterative reentrant processing was formalized in a computational model that provides an excellent fit to the data. The model provides a more comprehensive account of all forms of visual masking than do the long-held feed-forward views based on inhibitory contour interactions.Times Cited: 63 Great paper. A model of experimental design and analysis plus emphasis on functional theory building. Nicely done.$://000165458500009 Dolan, R. J. 2002& Emotion, cognition, and behaviorSciencej 298p 5596 1191-1194: Nov 8%Dolan02_Sci.pdf 2004-09-03ISI:000179080400032unilateral temporal lobectomy; skin-conductance responses; event-related fmri; human amygdala; prefrontal cortex; facial expressions; neural activity; declarative memory; major depression; decision-making4.Emotion is central to the quality and range of everyday human experience. The neurobiological substrates of human emotion are now attracting increasing interest within the neurosciences motivated, to a considerable extent, by advances in functional neuroimaging techniques. An emerging theme is the question of how emotion interacts with and influences other domains of cognition, in particular attention, memory, and reasoning. The psychological consequences and mechanisms underlying the emotional modulation of cognition provide the focus of this article.Times Cited: 32$://000179080400032c'Inst Neurol, Wellcome Dept Imaging Neurosci, London WC1N 3BG, England. Dolan, RJ, Inst Neurol, Wellcome Dept Imaging Neurosci, Queen Sq, London WC1N 3BG, England. Edwards, W. 1962F@Dynamic Decision-Theory and Probabilistic Information-Processing Human Factors4x2 59-73[% paper 2004-11-08ISI:A1962CGW7900001The development of a dynamic decision thoery will be central to the impending rapid expansion of reseach on human decision processes. Of a taxonomy of six decision problems, five require a dynamic theory in which the decision maker is assumed to make a sequence of decisions, basing decision n + 1 on what he learned from decision n and its consequences. Research in progress on information seeking, intuitive statistics, sequential prediction, and Bayesian information processing is reviewed to illustrate the kind of work needed. The relevance of mathematical developments in dynamiic programming and Bayesian statistics to dynamic decison theory is examined. A man-computer system for probabilistic processing of fallible military information is disscused in some detail as an application of these ideas and as a setting and motivator for future research on human information processing and decision making..'Times Cited: 125 Interesting in parts.$://A1962CGW7900001 Ekman, P. 1992Are There Basic EmotionsPsychological Review993550-553 Jul%Ekman92_PsycRvw.pdf 2004-09-16ISI:A1992JE92400010VOnervous-system activity; brain physiology; expression; contempt; imagery; angerOrtony and Turner's (1990) arguments against those who adopt the view that there are basic emotions are challenged. The evidence on universals in expression and in physiology strongly suggests that there is a biological basis to the emotions that have been studied. Ortony and Turner's reviews of this literature are faulted, and their alternative theoretical explanations do not fit the evidence. The utility of the basic emotions approach is also shown in terms of the research it has generated. <5Times Cited: 85 (Aug 2004) Used in seminar Fall 2004$://A1992JE92400010 Geisler, W. S. Kersten, D. 2002&Illusions, perception and BayestNature Neuroscience56508-510t Jun%Geisler&Kersten02_NN.pdfISI:000175874600005A new model shows that a range of visual illusions in humans can be explained as rational inferences about the odds that a motion stimulus on the retina results from a particular real-world source. Times Cited: 8 (Aug 2004)&$://000175874600005