Nonfiction Books ||
Technical Papers ||
Technical Presentations ||
Opinion Pieces ||
Letters to the Editor ||
AI and Literary Creativity: Inside the Minds of Brutus,
A Storytelling Machine,
with David Ferrucci of IBM's T.J. Watson Research.
Web Page for
Abortion: A Dialogue, Hackett Publishing Company.
- What Robots Can and Can't Be
"Creativity, the Turing Test, and the (Better) Lovelace Test,"
forthcoming in Minds and Machines.
"Real Robots and the Missing Thought-Experiment in
the Chinese Room Dialectic", in a book on Searle edited
by John Preston and Mark Bishop, forthcoming from Oxford University Press.
"Animals, Zombanimals, and the Total Turing Test: The Essence of
forthcoming in Journal of Logic, Language and Information.
"A Refutation of Penrose's Godelian Case Against Artificial Intelligence,"
forthcoming in Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial
"In Defense of Logical Minds"
was right about the development of deductive competence; most of those
in the psychology of reasoning are wrong.) Pages 173-78 in Proceedings
of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science
Society (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum).
"Chess is Too Easy"
"Eccles-iastical Dualism: Review of Eccles'
Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self" (w/
Need to Concern Itself with Consciousness?" AISB.
My Zombie Portrait/Papers
"Why Did Evolutionan Engineer Consciousness?" forthcoming in
Evolving Consciousness, edited by Gregory Mulhauser (w/ Ron
- Deep Blue vs. Kasparov...
- "Cognition is not Computation: The Argument From Irreversibility,"
ancestor of paper forthcoming in Synthese.
- "Computation, Among Other Things,
is Beneath Us," (1995) Minds and Machines 4: 469-488 (abstract
and key parts only).
- An early draft of Bringsjord, S. and Ferrucci, D. (1998)
"Logic and Artificial
Intelligence: Still Married, Divorced, Separated...?"
Minds and Machines 8: 273-308.
(The polished, expanded journal version includes
commentary and response.)
- "The Case Against Strong AI
From Imagistic Expertise," preprint of a paper that appeared long ago in
The Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence,
co-written with Elizabeth Bringsjord.
- "Could, How Could We Tell If, and Why Should--Androids Have
Inner Lives," in Android Epistemology, edited by Ken Ford,
Clark Glymour, and Pat Hayes. This paper sums up my reasons for
Turing Test (and other more stringent tests in the same spirit).
To get information on this paper, and
the book in which it appears, click
- "In Defense of Impenetrable Zombies," my response to Moody on zombies
in the Journal of Consciousness Studies.
- "Searle on the
Brink" (Volume 1 of Psyche)
An issue of Think on Harnad; contributions from Harnad, Searle,
Fetzer, Hayes, Dietrich, etc.
"Living a (Non-Schizophrenic!) Symbiosis Between Philosophy,
Psychology, and Computer Science" presented at the University of
Virginia, April 22, 2002.
"Is it Possible to Create Dramatically Compelling Interactive
Digital Entertainment?" presented at the IT University of Denmark, March
"Can a Computing Machine Be Genuinely Creative?," by
Slides for a presentation to Exxon Corporation, February 16, 2000.
"Creativity, the Turing Test, and the (Better) Lovelace Test," by
Selmer Bringsjord, Paul Bello, and David Ferrucci.
for the presentation at Turing 2000, at Dartmouth -- where it
all (arguably) started.
- "Entrepreneurial IT in the Age of Smart
Machines" (symposium as part of Shirley Jackson's inauguration)
- "Hard Data in Defense of Logical Minds"
"Scientifically Informative Discovery of (Godel's) Model-Based
December 1998, Milan, Italy.
"The Impact of Computing on Epistemology: Knowing Godel's Mind
Through Computation," Keynote Address for Annual Computing and Philosophy
Conference, World Congress of Philosophy, August 13, 1998, Boston, MA.
- "Is Spock's Mind Desirable?"
- "Selmer qua Minsky/McCarthy Contra Fetzer," 1997 Annual
Computing and Philosophy Conference.
on Deep Blue vs. Kasparov, presented at AAAI-97, and the primogenitor for
"Chess is Too Easy".
- "Computationalism is Dead; Now What?" Response to Jim
Fetzer's "Minds Are Not Computers: (Most) Thought
Processes Are Not Computational,"
with response to my response, and to Fetzer as well, from William J.
Rapaport. Eighty-eighth Annual Meeting, Southern Society for
Philosophy and Psychology , Nashville Tennessee, April 5, 1996.
- "How to Explain the Phi Phenomenon Without
Dennett's Exotica: Good Ol' Computation Does Just
Fine" presented at the 1996 annual
Computing and Philosophy Meeting, August, Pittsburgh, PA.
- Click here
to experience phi yourself and register your impressions! (You must be
- "Dennett vs. Searle on Cognitive Science: It All Boils Down
to Zombies, and Searle is Right"
was presented at the annual meeting of
the American Philosophical Association, December 1994, Boston, MA. This
paper has now been developed into "The Zombie Attack on the Computational
Conception of Mind,"
which includes my discussion of responses
to the original paper from Dennett, Searle, Harnad, and Robert Van Gulick.
Just click to view:
- Soft Wars
- In Mass-Market Newspapers
- In Publications Generally Internal to Rensselaer Community
Letters to the Editor
Top Level of
Selmer Bringsjord / email@example.com