next up previous
Next: Color Phi and Dennett's

Explaining Phi Without
Dennett's Exotica:
Good Ol' Computation Suffices



Perhaps the cornerstone of Daniel Dennett's case for his ``multiple drafts" view of consciousness in his Consciousness Explained is a set of inferences he draws from the phi phenomenon. We explain why these inferences are incorrect, in part by explaining phi (as replicated in our own lab) in such a way that it is consistent with the standard conceptions of consciousness Dennett seeks to supplant. (You are directed to --'s web site (URL above) for this paper, for the Turing Machine tex2html_wrap_inline336 discussed herein, and for a Java-based version of the color phi phenomenon which you can experience and react to.)

Selmer Bringsjord
Wed Dec 18 23:55:49 EST 1996