

(H4) Main Theses At Issue

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Philosophy of AI

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1. The Turing Test (or, more precisely, Turing's position with respect to it in his *Mind* paper) is acceptable.
2. Some variation on TT (e.g., Harnad's Total TT) is acceptable.
3. Searle's Chinese Room Argument is sound.
4. Bringsjord's modified CRA is sound.
5. When it comes to AI and Cog Sci, zombies are central; that they are possible is a genuine threat to AI/Cog Sci (as Searle and Bringsjord, *contra* Dennett, hold).
6. Computationalism (\approx persons are computers) is refuted in this course by Bringsjord.
 - Computationalism is refuted by "The Argument From Irreversibility" (online versions currently available through my home page).
 - Because persons have free will, and automata can't, persons can't be automata (and hence Computationalism falls).
 - \vdots
7. Computers can't be creative.
8. BRUTUS, the Ferrucci-Bringsjord system featured in their *Artificial Intelligence, Literary Creativity, and Story Generation*, is (will be) creative.

9. Church's Thesis is refuted by Bringsjord's attack based on the set of all interesting stories.
10. Humans are fundamentally and incurably irrational, while computing machines aren't (so how can humans be computing machines?).
11. OSCAR might well be refined into a person, and certainly vindicates "logician" (or perhaps "hybrid") AI.
12. Steven Pinker is right when in his *How the Mind Works* he argues that minds are (computing) machines that have been engineered by evolution.
13. Persons evolved.
14. Penrose's Gödelian Attack on AI is sound.
15. The Bringsjord/Arkoudas *modalized* Gödelian argument against computationalism is sound.
16. Robots can't have emotions (despite what's shown in *Blade Runner* and *The Matrix*).