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Next: References Up: Chess Isn't Tough Enough: Previous: ``McNaught" and Infinite Games

On the ``Big" Questions Driving the Workshop

We end by turning to questions in the 6 bullets from the original call for submissions (we have separated questions when more than one is given under a bullet):

In order to answer these questions, let's distinguish between thinking tex2html_wrap_inline447 and thinking. Thinking tex2html_wrap_inline447 is ``access thinking," which merely involves the processing of information in certain impressive ways. Thinking is quite another thing: it is ``phenomenal thinking," i.e., thinking that crucially involves subjective or phenomenal awareness: if one thinks about that trip to Europe as a kid (e.g.), one remembers what it was like to be (say) in Paris on a sunny day with your older brother - whatever: any such example will do. The distinction between these two senses of thinking has its roots in a recent distinction made by Ned Block between A-consciousness and P-consciousness [Block, 1995]. Adapting the first of these notions, we can hazard the following definition.

  figure123
Figure 3: A Simple Game of ``McNaught"

Thinking tex2html_wrap_inline447
An agent S thinks tex2html_wrap_inline447 iff it has internal states the representations of which are
  1. inferentially promiscuous, i.e., poised to be used as a premise in reasoning;
  2. poised for (rational) control of action; and
  3. poised for rational control of speech.

Here is how Block characterizes the notion of P-consciousness:

So how should we point to P-consciousness? Well, one way is via rough synonyms. As I said, P-consciousness is experience. P-conscious properties are experiential properties. P-conscious states are experiential states, that is, a state is P-conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality of the experiential properties of a state are ``what it is like" to have it. Moving from synonyms to examples, we have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste and have pains. P-conscious properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings and perceptions, but I would also include thoughts, wants and emotions. [[Block, 1995], p. 230]

Accordingly, we can say that an agent S thinks iff it has P-conscious states.

Now we can synoptically present our answers to the big questions [many of which are discussed in [Bringsjord, 1992]]:

O1
There are certainly thinking tex2html_wrap_inline447 machines!
O2
Deep Blue is one of them. (So is BRUTUS tex2html_wrap_inline287 . There are no thinking machines, and if the machines in question are computers, thinking machines won't ever arrive.)
E
The Turing Test (and the debate game, S tex2html_wrap_inline259 G, and possibly the infinite games we pointed to above) forms a sufficient condition for intelligence tex2html_wrap_inline447 (= thinking tex2html_wrap_inline447 ). I.e., if x passes TT (excels in S tex2html_wrap_inline259 G), then x is intelligent tex2html_wrap_inline447 (= thinks tex2html_wrap_inline447 ). There are no empirical tests for thinking [Bringsjord, 1995].
F1
It means that we are heading toward an age where the boundaries between human persons and intelligent tex2html_wrap_inline447 machines will blur. It's a milestone, a big one. It indicates that people had better buckle their seatbelts for an age in which, behaviorally, AIs can truly walk among us.
F2
Deep Blue is AI tex2html_wrap_inline447 . Deep Blue is not AI. Deep Debate, if successful, might lay a better claim to AI -- but we still wouldn't have any way to know for sure.
H
We defer to others.
T1
We defer to others.
T2
The future is incredibly bright. We currently have the technology to create ever more sophisticated thinking tex2html_wrap_inline447 machines. And it may be that such machines can do 80% of the work done presently by humans.
E
Hey, this question is backwards. It should be: ``Why the emotional attachment to Strong AI seen in many philosophers, cognitive scientists, and AIniks?"


next up previous
Next: References Up: Chess Isn't Tough Enough: Previous: ``McNaught" and Infinite Games

Selmer Bringsjord
Mon May 12 11:57:39 EDT 1997